

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND  
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION  
SECURITY INDEX**

**FILE NUMBER: 100-358086**

**SECTION : 14**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

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## **NOTICE**

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686

list

SAC, Omaha

June 25, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX - *GENERAL*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
REGISTERED MAIL  
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

ReBulet dated December 29, 1950.

There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.

The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.

Enclosure

*[Handwritten signature]*

FBI  
JUN 26 1951

RECORDED - 73

EX-60 437802

JUN 28 1951  
80

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
F.B.I.

MAILED 422 JUN 28

REC'D - 1012043 6-28-51

MAILED 5  
JUN 26 1951  
COMM-FBI

F107

✓ 13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 22, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX GENERAL


PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 90 new cards were added to the Security Index and 5 cards were canceled, a net increase of 85 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,128.





600 changed  
to  
11-17

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, Cleveland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951.

Above letter requested that a current report be submitted within 90 days on each Security Index subject employed in a Vital Facility unless a report was submitted during the previous six months.

This is to advise that, in accordance with the above instructions, current reports regarding all SI subjects in this category have been submitted by this office.

689  
charged  
to  
32-25

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7-2-51

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
NEW HAVEN OFFICE

Re: SAC Letter #100 dated 12-28-50, paragraph C entitled, "Security Index".

All Security Index cards in the New Haven Office at the present time are in an up to date status, and all addresses and employments for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the past six months.

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: July 3, 1951

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC let #26 dated 3/13/51 requesting advice when reports have been prepared and disseminated on all Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities.

Pittsburgh has prepared and properly disseminated reports to interested agencies on all Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities in accordance with SAC let.

690  
changed  
to  
39-18

671 changed  
to  
50-18

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, SEATTLE  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
SEATTLE OFFICE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE:

July 2, 1951

Re SAC Letter #100, Series 1950, dated 12/28/50, subsection C, captioned "Security Index" instructing that the Bureau be advised each six months whether all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six months.

Please be advised that all Security Index cards in this division are in an up-to-date status and addresses of all Security Index subjects have been checked within the past six months, with the exception of the following:

These five individuals have been missing from the Seattle Division since August 1950 and their whereabouts has been unknown. In the cases of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, no information whatever is available as to their current whereabouts. Within the past three days information has been received indicating that \_\_\_\_\_ is employed and residing in Chicago, Ill. Within the same period of time information has also been received that \_\_\_\_\_ is expected in Seattle within a few days. As soon as the information has been verified on these subjects form FD-122 will be submitted on them. The case files on all of these five subjects are in a pending active status and investigation is being conducted currently to locate them.

692

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 15, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *CONFIDENTIAL*  
VITAL FACILITIES

PURPOSE:

To report that on May 22, 1951, ONI advised Liaison that Harvard University, a facility on the Key Facility List, had no classified contracts and that in view of this they were advised by Bulet dated May 31, 1951, that the Bureau did not contemplate furnishing to them reports concerning individuals at Harvard on whom derogatory information has been obtained. Further, to report that on June 5, 1951, ONI advised Liaison that Harvard had contracts of an unclassified nature and that key men at Harvard had access to a document room where classified reports are stored. To recommend that in view of the fact that individuals at Harvard have access to classified material, although working on unclassified contracts, reports concerning individuals at Harvard on whom we developed derogatory information be furnished to ONI.

DETAILS:


The Boston Office, by letter dated April 30, 1951, captioned as above, advised the Bureau that they were in receipt of a Facility Security Survey Report on the president and fellows of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, made by the First Naval District at Boston, Massachusetts. The Boston Office noted that in this connection a copy of the survey, as furnished to the Boston Office by the Commandant, First Naval District, indicates the officials of Harvard University stated that Harvard would not care to participate in the survey and declined to furnish data requested by the U.S. Navy. It was also noted that the Boston Office has several security index subjects located at Harvard University who are either faculty members or members of the student body.

By referenced letter the Bureau was also advised that since the University has consistently refused to take on classified contracts, there is some question as to the extent or location of the vital facility at Harvard University, if such exists. *14*

As a result of this information being furnished the Bureau, the Liaison Section was requested to determine through ONI whether or not Harvard was on the Key Facility List and, if so, whether they were receiving classified contracts.

746 On May 22, 1951, Lieutenant Commander *CONFIDENTIAL*, ONI, was contacted by *CONFIDENTIAL*, Liaison Section, advised Agent *CONFIDENTIAL*, after making numerous telephone calls within the Pentagon, that Harvard was a facility on the Key Facility List

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and that at the present time no classified contracts had been awarded. Lieutenant Commander [redacted] further advised that Harvard had advised the Navy Department that they do not want classified contracts.

The information received from Lieutenant Commander [redacted] was furnished the Internal Security Section with the result that on May 31, 1951, the Bureau wrote the Department of the Navy and stated that, in connection with the recent inquiry concerning Harvard University and it being determined that no classified contract had been awarded Harvard, the Bureau did not contemplate furnishing to ONI reports concerning individuals at Harvard University on whom derogatory information has been developed until such time as a contract has been awarded.

On June 5, 1951, this letter was brought to the attention of Mr. [redacted] who advised that the Bureau had probably been misinformed concerning contracts to Harvard, in view of the fact that contracts were presently outstanding. Mr. [redacted] was advised that Lieutenant Commander [redacted] had already explored this matter when contacted on May 22, 1951, and had advised that no contracts had been awarded to Harvard. As a result of this, Lieutenant Commander [redacted] was called into conference with Mr. [redacted] and Agent [redacted] and in addition, Lieutenant [redacted], who is familiar with Harvard University, was in attendance. Lieutenant [redacted] advised that Harvard had been awarded contracts of an unclassified nature and that key men at this facility have access to classified reports which are stored in the document room. He also advised that a survey of a facility security nature had been made in January, 1951, and that it had been determined that the policy of Harvard University has been and still is not to accept classified work. The survey reflected that the University has not been cleared to handle classified matter, however, several of the professors have been cleared to do classified research work on a consultant basis. It was also indicated that a document room under the cognizance of the Office of Naval Research, where classified reports are stored, has been granted a secret clearance.

Lieutenant Commander [redacted] expressed surprise that the Office of Naval Intelligence had not been apprised of the fact that Harvard was doing work on unclassified contracts. Mr. [redacted] advised that although Lieutenant Commander Coombs had informed the Bureau properly as he had no knowledge of unclassified contracts being in existence at Harvard, he was indeed sorry we had not been fully informed as to this matter.

Lieutenant Commander [redacted] expressed the opinion that apparently someone in the Navy was trying to appease Harvard University due to their attitude concerning acceptance of classified contracts and as far as he was concerned, the contracts

awarded, although termed unclassified, should more appropriately be classified and treated accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the fact that individuals at Harvard have access to classified material although working on unclassified contracts for Navy, it is recommended that the reports concerning individuals at Harvard on whom we develop derogatory information be furnished to ONI, it being noted that ONI is entitled to reports of this nature under the Delimitations Agreement. It is also recommended that this memorandum be referred to the Internal Security Section and that the Boston Office and the Office of Naval Intelligence be apprised of our decision in this matter.

*list*  
*693*  
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: July 6, 1951.

FROM : SAC, OMAHA

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

*GENERAL*

ReBuLet June 25, 1951. The list dated June 25, 1951, has been received, and the list dated May 31, 1951, has been destroyed by burning.

The list received April 27, 1951, has also been destroyed by burning. It is noted that the Bureau was not previously advised on this.

RECORDED - 152

JUL 9 1951

EX-129

JUL 17 1951



694

list

Mr. Peyton Ford  
Deputy Attorney General

June 25, 1951

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INDEX LIST

GENERAL

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of individuals maintained in the Security Index. This list is subdivided alphabetically under the field offices of this Bureau covering the residence of the individuals listed.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

NOTE: List contains all names in Security Index except the Special Section "Espionage."

*Deleted personally  
to Col. W. H. H. H. H. H.  
at Dept. of Justice  
& destroyed. PHE*

RECORDED - 25

JUL 10 1951  
13

EX - 39

RECEIVED  
FBI  
JUN 26 11 17 AM '51


RECEIVED  
JUL 10 1951

✓ 13

AK

21

PHE



615  
changed  
to  
37-22

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: July 9, 1951


FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA

"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL"

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated April 12, 1951, and SAC Letter Number 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951 directing that a current report be submitted within ninety days on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility, unless a report was submitted during the previous six months.

This is to advise that reports have been duly filed by this office in all cases in the above category.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7/3/51

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC letter #100, dated 12/28/50, Section C.

This is to advise that a review of the Security Index Cards in this office reflects that addresses for all of the subjects have been verified within the last six months and that the cards are in an up-to-date status.

696  
changed  
3-14

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 8, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.


DETAILS

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on May 11, 1951:

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
May 12-18	111	15	96
May 19-25	137	7	130
May 26-June 1	62	7	55
June 2-June 8	<u>149</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>133</u>
Totals	459	45	414

The Security Index count as of today is 15,341.

For your information, during the preceding four-week period, from April 14, to May 11, 1951, 408 new cards were added, 39 cards were cancelled, or a net increase during that period of 450 cards.



15-16

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: July 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX,  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

Re Section C, SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950.

The Security Index cards of this division are in an up-to-date status. Addresses of all subjects have been verified or determined during the past six months.



699 changed  
to  
37-23

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI


DATE: July 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re Section "C" of SAC Letter #100, Series 1950, dated 12/28/50.

The addresses and places of employment of all Security Index subjects in this office have been checked within the past six months with the exception of those presently being handled. These will be finished within the next week or ten days.



700 changed  
to  
36-11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/9/51

FROM : SAC, OMAHA

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
OMAHA OFFICE

Re SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950, dated 12/23/50, Section (C)  
and Omaha letter dated 1/15/51.

All Security Index Cards have been checked and are in an up-to-date  
status. The addresses for the Security Index subjects have been  
checked by the Omaha Office within the past six months.

701 changed  
to  
52-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: July 6, 1951

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI


: SAC, ~~SPRINGFIELD~~

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

R

Re Section 87 (C) 3b, Manual of Instructions.

The Security Index cards maintained by the Springfield Office are in an up-to-date status, the addresses and employments having been checked within the past six months.





702  
changed  
to  
25-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 10, 1951

FROM : SAC, Little Rock

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ReSAClet No. 100, Series 1950, dated  
December 28, 1950.

This is to advise that the information  
appearing in the Security Index in this Division has  
been checked within the past month and is current.

703  
changed  
to  
22-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64


*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : *W* SAC, Anchorage  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARDS

DATE: July 9, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 100, dated 12/28/50, Paragraph C.

This is to advise that the security index cards of subjects residing in this Territory are in an up-to-date status and addresses have been checked within the past six months.



*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 24, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - PITTSBURGH OFFICE

PURPOSE

To advise you of the administrative procedure used by the Pittsburgh Office in following assignments in the Detcom Program and the verification of residence and business addresses.

BACKGROUND

The Bureau by letter dated February 27, 1950, authorized the Pittsburgh Office to institute a tickler system to assist in following Security Index cases for the purpose of verifying residence and business addresses.


The Pittsburgh Office by letter dated March 8, 1951, advised that it had adopted the policy of assigning verification of residence and business addresses of Security Index subjects to the Agents responsible for their apprehension under the Detcom Program.

To facilitate the administrative handling of these assignments they have added to their tickler system an alphabetical section consisting of three by five cards showing the name of the Security Index subject and the name of the Agent to whom this subject is assigned under the Detcom Program.

In addition they have a second set of three by five cards arranged alphabetically by Agents showing the subjects assigned to the Agents under the Detcom Program.


The Pittsburgh Office has advised that this arrangement enables the office to maintain assignments under the Detcom Program on a current basis and make any reassignments immediately upon notice of change of employment or address of a particular subject. It also enables the office to keep the six monthly verification of the employment and residence addresses of the Security Index subjects in an up-to-date condition at all times.

The Pittsburgh Office desired to bring the above administrative procedure and tickler system to the attention of the Bureau since they found this system to operate in such a satisfactory manner.



RECOMMENDATION

In view of the fact that the matters referred to by the Pittsburgh Office are purely administrative in nature, it is suggested this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division for their approval. The Security Division has no objection to the administrative devices now being used by the Pittsburgh office in handling the Detcom Program.



705  
changed  
to  
4-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SA, BIRMINGHAM


DATE: July 14, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CP, ANTIST PARTY - USA  
DISTRICT OF  
BIRMINGHAM DIVISION  
(SECURITY INDEX)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Re: SAC Letter No. 100 dated December 23, 1950, Series  
1950.

This is to advise that of the eleven security index  
subjects of this office, the security index cards are in an up-  
to-date status with regard to all of them except , on  
whom there is no photograph currently available. The addresses  
with regard to the following security index subjects have been  
verified as follows:



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 5, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION TO MARK CERTAIN SECURITY  
FILES IN A DISTINCTIVE MANNERPURPOSE

To advise you concerning the suggestion of the Los Angeles Office to place a stamp on the file cover or a distinctive colored sheet of paper as the top serial in the file to indicate whether the subject of the file is a Security Index subject or a name in the Communist Index.


BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles Office advised they have approximately 10,000 names in the Communist Index and 1,315 names in the Security Index. The Los Angeles Office states that security matter files are being handled constantly by supervisors and others in the Office and that it would be of extreme value and would save considerable time on the part of agent personnel if there were some obvious indication on the file that the individual is the subject of a Security Index card or a Communist Index card. The Los Angeles Office recommends that a rubber stamp, about two inches high, be used to mark the outside of the file jacket S.I. (Security Index) or C.I. (Communist Index) as the case may be.

The Los Angeles Office requests that if the stamp is not approved, consideration be given to placing as a top serial a sheet of paper of distinctive coloring on which the letters "C.I." or "S.I." would be stamped. This top serial would not be serialized but would be carried forth as the top serial in the last section of each such file.

A similar suggestion was previously submitted by the Los Angeles Office in which the Bureau was requested to authorize the placing of a three by five card bearing the letters "Security Index" or "Communist Index" on the top of the file. This suggestion was submitted to the Executive Conference on October 25, 1950, at which time a decision was made to submit the suggestion to a number of field offices.

Appropriate replies had been received from the field offices, this matter was again taken up at the Executive Conference on November 27, 1950, and the suggestion was unanimously approved and the Los Angeles Office was so advised.



OBSERVATION


Under normal conditions existing in the majority of Field Offices, it is not believed the suggestion of the Los Angeles Office would be of any great value as a time saver.

The Los Angeles Office, however, does have 106 National Defense Informants and, therefore, has a rather large number of memoranda submitted by informants which must be channelized to the individual case files and the notation suggested by the Los Angeles Office indicating whether the subject of the case file was already in the Security Index or merely a name in the Communist Index would assist the Supervisor or Agent handling the memorandum to decide what action was necessary.

RECOMMENDATION

The Security Division has no objection to the suggestion of the Los Angeles Office as it is presented at this time and did not have any objection to the original suggestion that was submitted by the Los Angeles Office and considered by the Executive Conference on November 25, 1950.

Inasmuch as the suggestion of the Los Angeles Office is entirely administrative in nature, it is suggested the Inspection and Training Division give additional consideration to the suggestion made by the Los Angeles Office.



TO : THE DIRECTOR  
FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

DATE: 6/2/51

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #733  
EMPLOYEE: SA JACK U. RICHARDSON  
LOS ANGELES OFFICE  
MARK CERTAIN SECURITY FILES  
IN A DISTINCTIVE MANNER

MEMBERS PRESENT: MEMBERS.

SUGGESTION:

The Los Angeles Office suggested that a rubber stamp be used to mark the outside of file covers with the letters "CI" or "SI," signifying Communist Index and Security Index, respectively, on those case files maintained on individuals who are the subjects of Security Index or Communist Index cards.

As an alternate proposal the employee suggested that, if the stamp is not approved, consideration be given to placing as the top serial a sheet of paper of distinctive coloring on which the letters "CI" or "SI" would be stamped.

ADVANTAGES:

1. Since such files are handled constantly by supervisors and Agents, it would save time if there was an obvious indication on the file that the individual is the subject of a Security Index card or Communist Index card.
2. At present the Supervisor must constantly check to see if a Security Index or Communist Index card has been prepared. This clerical work would largely be eliminated if the suggestion were adopted.
3. It would be a quick signal that the file contains a Security Index card where a report is received showing change of address or change of employment.



DISADVANTAGES:

1. The fact that the subject appears on the Communist Index is of no special significance at any time and it appears that no purpose would be served in so stamping the files.
2. The fact that a person is on the Security Index is apparent even on cursory examination of the file since the file will contain Forms FD-154 (Form for verification of information on Security Index card) and FD-123 (Form recommending the Security Index card be prepared). A brief examination of the file will denote the person is on the Security Index and it is believed no further notation is necessary on such files.
3. The status of these subjects changes from time to time which would entail the necessity of keeping the stamp up to date and might create a basis for errors.
4. Any serial being considered in connection with the file should either be evaluated in respect to the contents of the file or simply initialed for filing. If the serial requires evaluation, it requires an examination of the file. Therefore, the placing of the stamp on the file front is of no value.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

Messrs. [redacted] opposed the suggestion for the above reasons.

He favored the suggestion as to stamping the cover because the Los Angeles Office has indicated that they presently spend a large amount of time constantly checking the Security and Communist indices. He believes the procedure should be permitted in the Los Angeles Office.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: HHC:IGS

The Executive Conference on June 20, 1941, consisting of Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_ considered the above suggestion. In view of the fact that the Los

OK.  
P → Angeles Office has advised that this will save time, ~~therefore~~. ~~It is~~ recommended that the Los Angeles Office be authorized to stamp the cover in the manner indicated and after this procedure has been followed for sixty days, the Los Angeles Office will advise as to the effectiveness of its use and the matter could be considered for broad application throughout the Bureau.

All other members of the Conference were opposed feeling that this is just another type of log and that the adoption of this practice would lead to even further information being stamped on file covers and they were, therefore, opposed.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

708 changed to  
34-46

**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
New York 7, New York**

CONFIDENTIAL

July 13, 1951

Director, FBI

RE: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Dear Sir:

Re SAC letters No. 26 and 47, dated 3/13/51 and 5/12/51, remylet 6/13/51, and re No Number SAC letter of 2/5/51.


No Number SAC letter of 2/5/51 entitled "National Military Establishment, Internal Security - C; Confidential Plant Informants" enclosed a list entitled "Department of Defense Key Facilities List 1950 (Provisional)", which includes, as Item No. 73, "Port Facilities", and indicates the Strategic Code as , the Contracting Agency as , and the Responsible Agency as .

In view of the provision of SAC letter No. 47 requiring a report every six months as well as a check to ascertain if the particular subject has access to classified or restricted material in connection with his employment, I should like to raise the question as to whether merchant seamen should be considered employed in a vital facility coming within the descriptive term, "Port Facilities".

I should also like to point out that this office estimates it has several hundred seamen listed in the Security Index and it is our opinion that only a small portion of their employment involves being present in a port area. Furthermore, to submit a report every six months in these cases would be a considerable increase to the heavy volume of work now outstanding in this office.

It is felt that the persons meant to be covered by the designation, "Port Facilities", should more properly be construed as longshoremen, checkers, crane operators, watchmen, truck drivers, etc., who spend a more substantial portion of their working time in the port area than do seamen.

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Letter to Director  
NY

In this connection, recently the local office of Coast Guard has advised that it plans as soon as practicable to establish restricted areas in waterfront facilities where the following shipping activities are conducted:

1. Those vital to the Military Defense Assistance Program.
2. Those pertaining to the support of U. S. Military operations.
3. Those pertaining to loading and unloading explosives and other dangerous cargo.

Persons not holding current Coast Guard Port Security Cards or other credentials approved by the Commandant, USCG, will be barred from restricted areas while the above-named activities are actually being conducted.

The Coast Guard is urging voluntary adoption, by firms operating on the waterfront, of the policy of requiring possession of Coast Guard Port Security Cards or equivalent for entrance to waterfront property after the restricted areas have been established.

The Coast Guard has also pointed out again that it has in operation a full program of screening longshoremen, watchmen, and other "regular" waterfront employees. It is perhaps noteworthy that in its recent communication, Coast Guard speaks of "regular" waterfront employees as its responsibility and does not mention seamen at all, which would seem to indicate that seamen should not be considered as employed in a vital facility.

It may be noted that Coast Guard has invited comments and suggestions as to its program. However, this office does not intend to offer any although it is intended that steps will be taken, through liaison, to be apprised of the restricted areas when they are designated, and that steps will be taken to develop informants in those areas under the Plant Informant program.

Letter to Director  
NY

It is understood the Newark Division is also uncertain about whether seamen are to be considered as employed in a vital facility. Therefore, the advice of the Bureau is solicited in order to resolve this matter.

An early reply would be very much appreciated.

Very truly yours,

100 changed  
to  
34-46

W

SAC, New York

August 31, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re New York letter dated July 13, 1951, requesting Bureau advice as to whether seamen shall be considered employed in vital facilities. Enclosed for Newark is a copy of that letter.

New York advised that it was understood that the Newark Division was uncertain as to whether seamen should be considered as employed in a vital facility.

The Bureau desires to point out that even though a seaman has access to the port facilities only on a periodic basis and is not employed directly at the port facility, he nevertheless has as much access to classified and restricted information at the port facility during the time that he is in port as do longshoremen, crane operators and other individuals employed full time by the port facilities. For this reason it is necessary that seamen who are shipping out of port facilities included in the Vital Facilities List be considered as strategically employed. Henceforth, cases in your office involving seamen falling in the above category should be handled in accordance with provisions in SAC Letters Number 26 and 47 dated March 13, 1951 and May 12, 1951. It will be necessary to submit a report every six months on such individuals.

You should take the necessary action to assure that your office will be handling these cases in this manner in the future and that the individuals in your Security Index so employed are tabbed for priority apprehension in accordance with previous instructions.

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 17, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION

1 - GENERAL

## PURPOSE

To advise you concerning the Special Section of the Security Index.

### 1. Special Section of the Security Index.

A Special Section of the Security Index is maintained separate from the general index both in the Field and at the Bureau.

#### A. Purposes and Policy

The Special Section has been set up to separate the Security Index cards on certain individuals from those in the general section because for one reason or another the cases must receive special attention and handling in the event of an emergency. The Field has been instructed that no individual whose Security Index card is in the Special Section will be apprehended in an emergency without specific authorization from the Bureau.

Individuals whose Security Index cards are maintained in the Special Section will not be apprehended in an emergency until the case files are reviewed at the Bureau for a determination made at that time as to whether the individuals should be apprehended under the Program taking into consideration all factors involved. In every instance when an individual's name is carried in the Special Section, the individual's affiliations and activities in subversive matters are such as warrant a Security Index card according to the Bureau standards in that matter the same as individuals carried in the general section of the Security Index. The apprehensions of some individuals in the Special Section may be delayed or not effected at all after the emergency depending on various reasons fully explained hereinafter under the subheading "Breakdowns."

It seems  
to me we  
should  
decide  
now

4/23

2  
most cer-  
tainly. Ex. 100  
H.

B. Breakdowns

The Special Section of the Security Index is presently subdivided into seven categories, namely:


- Espionage
- Prominent Individuals
- Pro-Tito Yugoslavs
- Foreign Government Employees
- United Nations Employees
- Atomic Energy Program Employees
- United States Government Employees

It is mandatory that the Security Index cards for persons employed under the last four categories mentioned above be placed in the Special Section. Security Index cards are placed in the Espionage and Prominent Individuals subdivisions either on the recommendation of the supervisor of the individual case or the supervisor's approval of the Field's recommendation, which recommendations are in turn approved by the Section Chiefs of the Espionage and Internal Security Sections.

(1.) Espionage

Cards on certain Espionage subjects are maintained in the Special Section when apprehension in an emergency would destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating Soviet Espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel.

Names in this subdivision, for security reasons, have not been made available to the Department; however, the Field has been instructed to prepare a summary report in each such case suitable for dissemination which is held at the Bureau in readiness for dissemination to the Department if it is believed desirable to apprehend the individual at the time of an emergency. Also, the Field has been instructed to prepare reports each six months thereafter, suitable for dissemination providing interim reports are not suitable, which reports will be held at the Bureau and will not be disseminated





until such time as an apprehension is desired or the subject's Security Index card is removed from the Special Section.

Number of cards in Espionage subdivision - 62.

(2) Prominent Individuals

Security Index cards on certain individuals prominent in the business and professional fields are maintained in the Prominent Individuals subdivision of the Special Section because their apprehension might affect adversely other persons not in the Security Index who are necessary to the war effort or their apprehension might be attended by considerable publicity tending to make martyrs of them and thereby embarrass the Bureau.

Even though the Department has been furnished the names of the individuals whose cards are maintained in the Prominent Individuals subdivision, some individuals in this category probably will not be apprehended in an emergency depending on the status of the individual's subversive activities to be determined by a review of the case file at the time of any contemplated arrest, although sound basis for including their names in the Security Index exists today.

In order that the cases on individuals in this subdivision can be closely supervised and the Security Index card fully justified at all times inasmuch as they are highly controversial figures, the Field was instructed in SAC Letter Number 23, Series 1951, dated March 3, 1951, as follows:

To maintain these cases in a pending or pending-inactive status at all times.

To immediately submit prosecutive-type summary reports which will include all pertinent derogatory information.

To thereafter submit reports at least each six months.

To advise the Bureau promptly of any information that might affect the retention of the Security Index card.

To maintain cases in this category in such condition that the SAC at any time can evaluate the case to determine whether the Bureau is fully justified in apprehending the subject should the Program be placed in operation.

Case files on each person in this category have been carefully reviewed by the supervisor to whom the case is assigned before the individual named is placed on the Security Index to make certain that we are fully justified in taking that action. Copies of investigative reports on individuals in this category have been disseminated to the Department. In addition, as the current summary reports are received they are being reviewed for the same purpose. If the Security Index card is still fully justified copies of the summary reports are being forwarded to the Department. Supervisors have been instructed that if a review of the summary report indicates that the Security Index card is not fully justified, the Security Index card should be cancelled and, if the facts warrant, the Field should be instructed to conduct additional investigation with a view to developing sufficient derogatory information to justify a Security Index card.

The following is submitted in answer to a question raised as to whether

are on the Security Index and whether we would be in a position to arrest such individuals in an emergency. For your information, the names of and are not carried in the Security Index. The Security Index card for is in the Prominent Individuals Subdivision of the Special Section and the Security Index card for is in the Espionage subdivision of that section.

4

Our files reflect that an investigation was conducted of [redacted] in the Summer of 1950. This investigation indicated her to have been an entertainer and a sponsor of various functions held under the auspices of several Communist front organizations. This investigation did not reflect positive evidence of membership in the Communist Party on her part and the information developed did not warrant a Security Index card. ( )

There is no Security Index card for [redacted] although there is a pending investigation. Investigation to date indicates various connections, one way or another, with numerous Communist front organizations up until about 1949. He has been named by [redacted] as a concealed Communist. An informant reports he appears to have disassociated himself from Communist front activities during the past two years. When subpoenaed to appear before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in March, 1951, he issued a statement that he would be glad to cooperate with the Committee stating he had never been a member of the Communist Party, or a fellow traveler or sympathizer. On March 20, 1951, the " [redacted] " severely criticized him for making this statement. ( )

The Bureau has never conducted a security investigation on [redacted]. The Philadelphia office by memorandum dated December 12, 1945, advised the Bureau that a confidential informant had furnished information, received from an officer of a section of the Communist Party at Philadelphia, that [redacted] was a member of the Communist Party. Information available in the Bureau's files indicates that [redacted] participated in the activities of various Communist Party front organizations from about 1944 through 1947.

709

A security investigation was not initiated when the information was received that [redacted] was a member of the Communist Party because the facts were not such as warranted that action in accordance with Bureau policy at that time. By SAC Letter No. 40, Series 1945, dated 4-18-45, the Field had been advised that the opening of Security Matter - C cases should be on a selective basis and only on subjects then currently regarded as dangerous or potentially dangerous. In determining dangerousness the Field was instructed that mere membership in the Communist Party added to occasional attendance at meetings was not sufficient to indicate potential dangerousness.

The above policy remained in effect until changed by SAC Letter No. 48 dated 7-25-50 which instructed the Field that they should open cases for investigation on all individuals reported as present or alleged members of, or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. Prior to SAC Letter No. 48 cases were not opened on mere membership in, or affiliation with such organizations in the absence of other indications that the individual was dangerous or potentially dangerous due to Party training, employment in vital industry or defense installations, past service in the armed forces or other similar categories.

It is to be noted that last activity in CP front organizations according to the Bureau's files was in 1947 and that he offered his services to the Bureau as reported in memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. [redacted] dated September 7, 1950, to which Mr. [redacted] commented "We want nothing to do with him." We do not believe we should presently investigate [redacted] in view of his lack of activity. However, we are preparing a separate memorandum reflecting our present policy of opening cases, with examples set forth including [redacted], for discussion by the Executive Conference for the purpose of determining whether our policy is sound.

*Mr. [redacted]*  
*I suggest review of the and cases*  
*As indicated above, the Security Index cards for [redacted] and [redacted] are maintained in the Special Section and any apprehension of either party in the event of an emergency will depend on a review of their files at the time of an emergency.*  
*5-10-51*  
*- 6 -*

Number of Security Index cards  
in Prominent Individuals subdivision - 35.

(3) Pro-Tito Yugoslavs

This subdivision includes Security Index cards on those individuals who are pro-Tito, anti-Stalin, anti-Cominform and anti-Soviet. These cards are separated from those in the general section of the Index because the Tito Government and its supporters are at this time considered potential allies of, rather than potential dangers to, the United States. As long as the Tito Government is aligned with the United States and its Western European allies and against the Soviet, no good purpose can be served by applying an Emergency Detention Program to supporters of Tito.

The alignment of Tito and his followers will have to be determined at the time of an emergency. If at that time Tito is not an ally, the apprehension of individuals in this category can be immediately effected.

Copies of reports on individuals in this category have been furnished to the Department.

Number of Security Index cards in  
Pro-Tito Yugoslavs subdivision - 7.

(4) Foreign Government Employees

Foreign Government employees are maintained in the Special Section so that in the event of war we can give individual consideration to each such individual on the basis of the relations then existing between the United States Government and the country by which the individual is employed.

Copies of reports on individuals in this category have been furnished to the Department.

Number of Security Index cards in  
Foreign Government Employees subdivision - 27.

## (5) United Nations Employees.

United Nations employees and international organizations employees are maintained in the Special Section by reason of the fact that they are employees of international organizations. The Department has ruled that individuals may be apprehended providing they do not possess 3 (7) visas issued under the International Organizations Immunities Act but that the State Department should be advised after apprehensions because of their employment by international organizations. These cases will be considered individually at the time of an emergency and will be closely supervised at all times.

Copies of reports in cases in this category have been furnished to the Department.

Number of Security Index cards in United Nations Employees subdivision - 34.

## (6) Atomic Energy Program Employees.

Although the Department has ruled that individuals in this category can be arrested under the Program regardless of security clearance, Atomic Energy Program employees are maintained in the Special Section in order that they can be readily identified and because in certain instances the Bureau may desire to advise representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission prior to any arrest to avoid interference with atomic energy work.

Copies of reports on individuals in this category have been furnished to the Department and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Number of Security Index cards in Atomic Energy Program Employees subdivision - 9.

## (7) United States Government Employees.

Although the Department has ruled that United States Government employees can be arrested under the Program regardless of security clearance by Loyalty Review Boards, the Security Index cards for these individuals are maintained in the Special Section in order that the identities of these individuals can be readily determined and since in certain instances the Bureau may desire to advise the interested agency either prior or immediately following an arrest.

Copies of reports on these individuals have been furnished to the Department and, of course, under the Loyalty Program have been disseminated to the Loyalty Review Board and the interested agency.

Number of Security Index cards in United States Government Employees subdivision - 55.

C. Information Furnished the Department

As you know, a new Security Index list is furnished the Department every thirty days at which time the list previously furnished is obtained and destroyed. The Security Index list furnished the Department contains the names of all individuals in the general section and all names listed in the Special Section except those individuals carried under the Espionage subdivision. The names of those in the latter subdivision are not furnished for security reasons. The Department has been advised that names are maintained in the Special Section of the Security Index because, for one reason or another, a review and individual consideration must be given to each such case prior to apprehensions under the Program.

As previously indicated, copies of reports of all cases in the Special Section have been furnished to the Department except those in the Espionage subdivision.

ACTION

None. This is for your information.

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5732 \_\_\_\_\_  
Extension 565 \_\_\_\_\_

To: \_\_\_\_\_

Room \_\_\_\_\_

Please call me \_\_\_\_\_ Per conversation \_\_\_\_\_

*I suggest that Mrs.  
review our  
entire security  
index procedure*

*Jag H.*

1 ENC



710  
changed  
to  
2-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 13, 1951

FROM : SAC, Atlanta

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter No. 191, Series 1950 dated December 23, 1950  
and SAC Letter No. 63, Series 1951 dated May 26, 1951.

For the Bureau's information the residences and employment of  
all Security Index subjects maintained by the Atlanta Division  
have been verified within the past six months.

This is to advise that verification of addresses in Security  
Index cases in the Atlanta Division is being handled by means of  
an Administrative Tickler.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: July 13, 1951

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI


FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
MILWAUKEE DIVISION

Re SAC letter, No 100 dated December 28, 1950, Sec. C.

As of July 1, 1951 the addresses on all S.I. Subjects of the Milwaukee Office have been verified with the exception of bufile

Concerning \_\_\_\_\_, the Bureau is aware that this individual disappeared from Milwaukee in the fall of 1950. Intensive investigation including a general circularization, to determine her present whereabouts has met with negative results. This case is in a pending status and this office is continuing in its efforts to locate her.



712  
changed  
to  
44-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: 7/12/51

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950, Sub-section C.

For the information of the Bureau the Security Index cards maintained by the Salt Lake City Office are in an up to date status. The employment as well as the addresses for all Security Index card subjects are presently in the process of being checked and will be completed and appropriate changes made by 7/31/51.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 29, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX


PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 118 new cards were added to the Security Index and 7 cards were canceled, a net increase of 111 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,239.



*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 13, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS~~  
~~PHOTOGRAPHS OF SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS~~PURPOSE:

To submit for your approval the attached SAC Letter. This letter instructs the field to submit to the Bureau photographs and background memoranda on the subjects of cases being considered for prosecution under the Smith Act and to try to obtain photographs of all Security Index subjects.

DETAILS:


Attached is the Director's memorandum dated 7-9-51, in which he noted that some of the photographs appearing on the recently issued IO's on the missing Communists were either old or not very distinct. The Director stated that every effort should be made to obtain up-to-date photographs of persons we are seeking.

The Manual of Instructions provides that pictures of Security Index subjects should appear on the reverse side of S.I. cards maintained in the field. The Manual further provides that security investigations should not be kept in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining a photograph.

X In the preparation of the IO's referred to above it was noted that the files contained more recent pictures but they were not suitable for reproduction on an Identification Order.)

The attached SAC Letter instructs the field to intensify efforts to obtain recent reproducible photographs of all S.I. card subjects.

P31



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 6, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 66 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 58 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,297.



715

changed

to

42-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: 7-14-51

FROM : SAC, St. Louis

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter 100 dated 12-28-50, Sect. (C).

The Security Index Cards of this office are in an up-to-date status and addresses have been checked within the last six months.



11/6  
changed  
to  
11-18

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: July 14, 1951

FROM : SAC, CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950, dated  
December 28, 1950.

A review of the Security Index cards in this office reflects that as of July 1, 1951, these cards are in an up-to-date status and addresses verified within the past six months, with the exception of seventeen cards. Of these, six concern individuals who have moved to other cities and investigation is presently pending to verify their addresses. One Security Index subject is presently in Europe and his expected return date to this country is unknown. The whereabouts of two subjects is presently unknown and investigation is being conducted to ascertain their whereabouts. The seven remaining subjects' addresses were verified within the past eight months and their current addresses are in the process of being verified at this time.



changed  
to  
34-47

RA

Director, FBI

RE: SECURITY INDEX  
(Bufile

Dear Sir:

The latest project to bring these addresses to a current status was begun, on an office-wide basis, on March 15, 1951, at which time there were approximately 2800 persons listed in the Security Index of this office. As of today, there are approximately 563 instances where difficulty has been encountered in establishing either the residence or employment address, or, in some cases, both addresses of the subject. All of these cases are receiving investigative attention in an endeavor to complete the verifications as soon as possible. It has been noted that in about 48% of the cases handled thus far on the project, some change, usually a change in employment or residence, has been developed. In addition, the remaining cases where difficulty is being encountered will practically all result in development of changes which will increase the percentage of change in the Security Index as a whole.

B

Every effort, commensurate with the need to handle the other urgent work pending in the office, will be expended to complete this present project in the near future.

Very truly yours.



718  
changed  
to  
47-26

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 14, 1951

FROM : SAC, San Francisco

CONFIDENTIAL

AMSD

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter #100 dated 12/23/50.

In accordance with reference letter all address verifications have been made.

714 changed  
to  
53-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64


*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, WFO  
SUBJECT: 0 SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 13, 1951

Re SAC letter No. 100, Series 1950.

. Please be advised that the Security Index cards maintained by this office are in an up to date status and all addresses have been checked within the last six months.



720  
changed  
to  
35-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64


*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Oklahoma City  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 6, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950, dated December 28, 1950,  
Subsection (C), Security Index.

This is to advise that a check of the Security Index cards  
in this Office reflects they are all in an up-to-date status and  
the addresses for all Security Index subjects have been checked at  
least once during the past six months.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 14, 1951


FROM : SAC, Louisville

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
District No. 6  
Louisville Division  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C  
(SECURITY INDEX)

Re Section 87 C, 3, b. (6) Manual of Instructions.

The Security Index Cards maintained in this office are in an up-to-date status.

Addresses of all Security Index subjects in the territory of the Louisville Division have been checked within the past six months.



722  
changed  
to  
38-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI ( )

DATE: July 17, 1951


FROM : SAC, Phoenix

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC letter No. 100, series 1950, dated 12/28/50.

This is to advise the addresses of all Security Index subjects in the Phoenix office have been checked during the past 6 month period, and the Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status.



72-3  
changed  
to  
10-12

10-12



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, CINCINNATI  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: 7-16-51

Re SAC Letter #200, Series 1950, dated 12/28/50,  
this is to advise that all Security Index Cards in this office  
are in an up-to-date status and are correct for subjects of  
Security Index Cards have at all times during the last six  
months.



725  
changed  
to  
29-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: July 16, 1951

FROM *HA* SAC, Miami

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
MIAMI OFFICE

Re SAC Letter 100, December 28, 1950, Paragraph C.

Security Index Cards of Miami are UTD. Addresses of all SI  
Subjects have been checked within the past six months.





726  
changed  
to  
23-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/19/51

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
KANSAS CITY OFFICE

Re SAC letter number 100, Series 1950, dated  
December 28, 1950, paragraph C.

In accordance with these instructions, this is  
to advise that the Security Index cards of the Kansas  
City office are in an up-to-date status, and the addresses  
of all S.I. subjects have been checked within the last  
six months. There are at present two cases of S.I. sub-  
jects having left this territory and verification of  
new addresses by other offices has been requested.

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, FBI  
FROM SAC, San Juan  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 21, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 100, dated December 28, 1950.

This is to advise that address checks on all Security Index cards are being handled currently. Checks have been made on all addresses within the past six months.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 13, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on June 8, 1951:

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
June 9-15	114	12	102
June 16-22	90	5	85
June 23-29	118	7	111
June 30- July 6	66	8	58
July 7-13	88	13	75
Totals	476	45	431

The Security Index count as of today is 16,372.

For your information, during the preceding four-week period, May 12, to June 8, 1951, 459 new cards were added, 45 cards were cancelled, or a net increase during that period of 414 cards.

12/1 changed  
to  
18-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 20, 1951

FROM : SAC, Honolulu

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter 100, Series 1279, dated 12/28/50.

This is to advise that the addresses and employment of all Security Index Subjects in this Office have been verified within the past six months.



730  
changed to  
39-19

STANDARD FORM NO. 64


*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 19, 1951

Re SAC letter No. 100 dated December 28, 1950, and Pittsburgh letter to the Bureau dated January 13, 1951.

The residence and business addresses of all of Pittsburgh's 241 Security Index subjects have been verified during the past six months in accordance with Bureau instructions.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Denver

SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS  
IN SECURITY INDEX CASES

DATE: October 12, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 95, dated September 22, 1951.

Referenced SAC letter instructed that the Bureau be advised of the plans formulated and action taken in undertaking the project of preparing Summary Reports in all Security Index cases.

There are two cases in the Special Section of the Security Index; however, a Summary Report has been prepared within the past six months on one of these cases.

There are no top functionary cases in the Denver Office.

There are eight key figure cases other than the Smith Act Subjects.

All remaining Security Index cases are presently being reviewed, and those cases wherein no report has been submitted since January 1, 1949 will be assigned for the preparation of Summary Reports immediately. It is estimated that there will be approximately twenty-five cases in this category. There are approximately 140 Security Index Subjects in the Denver Office.

Excluding those cases included in Categories 1 through 6 and the Smith Act Subjects, there will remain approximately 99 cases that must be scheduled for the preparation of Summary Reports.

The Special Section, key figure and vital facility cases are being immediately assigned, and reports will be submitted to the Bureau by December 1, 1951.

Those cases appearing in Category No. 6 will be assigned December 1, 1951, and reports will be submitted to the Bureau by February 1, 1952.

The remaining cases will be reviewed and assigned when it is felt that these cases can be expeditiously handled and reports prepared.

On January 1, 1952, this office submits its report as to the status of this project. We should be in a better position to advise the Bureau of the status of the project and the time that will be necessary to complete this project.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :


DATE: June 27, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There is attached hereto a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of June 16, 1951.



732  
Enc 1

[illegible]



Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DATE: June 1, 1951  
FROM: [redacted], Deputy Attorney General  
SUBJECT: Program for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 11, 1951, entitled as above, wherein you requested a definite expression of the Department's opinion with respect to the standards set out in your memoranda of September 16, 1949, and July 27, 1950, applied by the Bureau in determining those individuals whose past or present activities, or training, showed them to be a potential danger to this country in times of emergency so as to warrant their inclusion on the Security Index.

As has been indicated in previous memoranda from the Department and pointed out at conferences between Department representatives and those of the Bureau, the Department feels it is advisable that, insofar as possible, the provisions of the detention program should parallel the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. Accordingly, it has revised the Security Index standards so as to conform more closely to those of the Act and in so doing has to good extent utilized the language of the statute. Enclosed are copies of the standards as so revised. You will note that in result the scope of the Bureau's standards is not appreciably altered.

Inasmuch as the Department is now prepared to go forward with the review of the Security Index, it will appreciate receiving your views with respect to the revised standards at your earliest convenience. In accordance with your request, you will be advised in advance as to the attorneys who will be engaged in this work and will also be advised as to the results of such review in each individual case as such reviews are completed. With the exception of particular cases as to which you request special notification, as illustrated by your memorandum of May 24, 1951, you are advised that the Department presently contemplates first reviewing the files on Federal Government employees, including Atomic Energy personnel, who are included on the Security Index.

Under date of May 22, 1951, a memorandum was addressed to you in original response to your memorandum of May 11, 1951. It has been pointed out that the language there employed is susceptible to a far broader interpretation than was intended. Accordingly, you are advised that the Department's memorandum of May 22, 1951, may be disregarded.

In this general connection, however, you are again reminded, as was pointed out in my memorandum of December 27, 1950, that in the event of occurrence of an emergency which requires the use of the detention program, all of the persons now or hereafter included by the Bureau on the Security Index should be considered subjects for immediate apprehension, thus resolving any possible doubt in cases in favor of the Government in the interests of the national security.

CONFIDENTIAL



## STANDARDS

The test to be applied is whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the person (subject) probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.

In deciding the question of the existence of reasonable ground to believe a person probably will engage in, or conspire with others to engage in, espionage or sabotage, each attorney is authorized to consider evidence of the following:

1. Whether such person has knowledge of, or has given, or or received, instruction or assignment in, espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage, except where such knowledge was obtained for lawful purposes;
2. Participation in any past act of espionage or sabotage or conspiracy to do so;
3. Activity at any time in the espionage or sabotage operations of the Communist Party or the world communist movement, unless such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the United States Government;
4. Membership in the Communist Party at any time prior to 1949;
5. Membership in the Communist Party at any time prior to 1949, which membership is not shown to have been discontinued, AND

- (a) Activity or receipt of training in the organization, thereby acquiring knowledge of its ultimate aims or purposes; or
- (b) A present position of importance in, or a substantial contribution to, any organization which is or can be used for Communist purposes; or
- (c) Present employment in or connection with the government or an industry or facility vital to the national defense, health and welfare; or
- (d) Despite the lack of present organizational ties, support and sympathy with the aims of the world communist movement.

SECRET



6. Actions and influential membership subsequent to January 1, 1949, in the on more Communist dominated or infiltrated organization and conducting thereof indicative of substantial adherence to the objectives of the Communist Party.

SECRET



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: [REDACTED]

DATE: June 8, 1951

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

PURPOSE

To advise you concerning the comparison made of the revised Security Index standards received from the Department with those presently used by the Bureau for including individuals in the Security Index.

DETAILS

There is attached a memorandum from [REDACTED] dated June 1, 1951, with which was enclosed the Department's revised Security Index standards. The memorandum requested the Bureau's views with respect to the revised standards and pointed out that insofar as possible the provisions of the detention program should parallel the provisions of the "Emergency Detention Act of 1950."

The revised standards will be used by Department attorneys in reviewing the files of the individuals who are on the Security Index.

The Department advised that the test to be applied is whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the person (subject) probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of sabotage or espionage.

In deciding the question of the existence of reasonable ground to believe a person probably will engage in or conspire with others to engage in sabotage or espionage, the Department instructed each Department attorney who will review Security Index cases to consider evidence of certain standards which will be set out hereinafter. Opposite the Department's standards there will be set forth the standard utilized by the Bureau which compares to the one used by the Department. In those instances where the Bureau's standard differs in any respect or clarification is believed necessary, appropriate explanations are set forth.

DEPARTMENT STANDARD

1. Whether such person has knowledge of, or has given or received in a structure or assignment in espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage, except where such knowledge was obtained for lawful purposes.

BUREAU STANDARD

Section 36, Manual of Instructions, Volume II, Page 17, states subjects of espionage investigations should in each instance receive consideration for their inclusion of their names in the Security Index as provided in Section 87 (Security Investigations).

Section 87, Page 33,

item (b) states "Party members who have had years of training and experience and who would be responsible for the actual execution of Party orders."

(d) Party members who have at any time been involved in networks of Red Army Intelligence, the MVD, or the MGB.

(l) Party members employed in any positions having potential fitness for espionage or sabotage.

(m) Party members who have been used as couriers or mail drops by the Party.

(q) While all the above specifically indicate Party membership as a prerequisite, the element of Party membership is not necessary for the preparation of a Security Index card. Obviously where an individual is affiliated with the Party, is under its discipline or is closely associated with the organization and the individual otherwise fulfills the requirements for the Security Index the individual should be included."

Comment:

Although this revised standard is generally the same as the Bureau's, it should be worded to cover espionage, counterespionage or sabotage service or procedures of a government or political party of a foreign country, except where such knowledge was obtained for lawful purposes on behalf of the Government of the United States. The addition of the words "service and procedures" covers more eventualities and actually follows the language of the "Emergency Detention Act of 1950."



DEPARTMENT STANDARD

BUREAU STANDARD

The "lawful purposes" should be indicated as on behalf of the Government of the United States as was probably intended by the Department's otherwise "lawful purposes" for subject to interpretation.

This standard should include the specific statement "unless such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States." Without this statement the Bureau would be acting on its own in excluding from the Security Index names of persons who have cooperated with agencies of this country.

2. Participation in any past act of espionage or sabotage or conspiracy to do so.

The Bureau standard set forth for number 1 also apply here.

Comment:

This standard would more effectively cover the Field if it included "attempts" to commit espionage or sabotage, thus reading "participation in any past act of espionage or sabotage or any past participation in any attempt or conspiracy to commit any acts of espionage or sabotage."

This standard should include the specific statement "unless such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the United States Government." As it now reads the Bureau would be acting on its own in excluding the name of a person from the Security Index who has cooperated with agencies of this Government.

3. Activity at any time in the espionage or sabotage operations of the Communist Party, or the world Communist movement, unless such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the United States Government.

The Bureau standard set forth for number 1 also apply here.



DEPARTMENT STANDARD

BUREAU STANDARD

Comments

It is to be noted that this standard takes cognizance of our Confidential Informants. The Department may consider individuals that have testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee and admitted their past membership. In many instances the Bureau has disregarded the fact that they testified because they revealed no real information concerning Communist activities and in this regard each case must necessarily be considered on the facts.

The revised standard fails to include counterespionage and to cover all eventualities. It should read in part: "in the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage services or procedures," as a person active in these fields could be in the "service" without participating in the operations. The suggested change follows the language of the "Emergency Detention Act of 1950."

The revised standard does not include revolutionary organizations or political parties other than the Communist Party or the world Communist movement, for example, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

4. Membership in the Communist Party after January 1, 1949.

Since July 25, 1950, membership in the Communist Party or other Marxist Revolutionary group has been considered sufficient reason to place the individual in the Security Index.

Manual of Instructions, Section 87, page 34, Item (q) provides that the element of Party membership is not necessary for the preparation of a Security Index card and that in those instances where an individual is affiliated with the Party, is under its discipline or is closely associated with the organization, and the individual otherwise fulfills the requirements for the Security Index, such an individual should be included in the Security Index.



DEPARTMENT STANDARDS

BUREAU STANDARDS

Comment:

The Bureau's standard as set forth above is much broader than the Department's standard in that the Bureau has considered the element of Party membership not necessary to include an individual in the Security Index. We are pointing this out to the Department.

There is a period from January 1, 1949 to July 25, 1950, when individuals meeting this standard were not necessarily placed in the Security Index.

It is believed desirable to instruct the Field to fully investigate all individuals reported as members of the Communist Party during the period between January 1, 1949 and July 25, 1950, and as each case is completed to decide whether the information developed warrants the submission of Form SD-122 recommending that the individual be placed in the Security Index.

This standard should include the qualification "unless there is a positive development the membership has either been discontinued or is offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States."

The revised standard does not include revolutionary organizations or political parties other than the Communist Party and should be changed to include such groups.

5. Membership in the Communist Party at any time prior to 1949, which membership is not shown to have been discontinued. AND



# DEPARTMENT STANDARDS

# BUREAU STANDARDS

(a) Activity for reception, training in the organization, thereby acquiring knowledge of its ultimate aims and purposes.

The Manual of Instructions, Sections 87, Page 33, item (a) provides that administrative heads of the Party with experience in organization, finance, administration, education, agitation, propaganda, or military tactics should be included in the Index as well as (b) Party members who have had years of training and experience, who would be responsible for the actual execution of Party orders.

## Comment:

Revised standard (a) is very broad and literally covers any training in the Party prior to January 1, 1949, no matter how far back the training occurred, when such membership is not shown to have been discontinued, providing the standard is to be construed as additive to place the names of all persons on the Index who come under those conditions and unless no evidence of such training for a period of time prior to January 1, 1949, can be construed as "discontinuance."

We have previously pointed out to the Department by memorandum dated May 11, 1951, that the Bureau has conducted thousands of investigations of individuals beyond those included in the Security Index and we now we to include all former members of such groups and sympathizers, the number of persons to be apprehended would be many times the present number. To include in the list all persons coming to our attention over the years, who are or have been sympathetic to subversive organizations or received training in those groups would, of course, further reduce the possibility of activities inimical to the best interest of the United States. However, as many such persons may have foolishly and mistakenly entered into such an association or have not participated in such activities in recent years, we pointed out that to include such persons for arrest in an emergency would cause irreparable injustice, not in keeping with the American concept of justice. These points will be included in our discussion with the Department.



the program as set out above in paragraph two under the comment to (a).

Nevertheless at this point will be discussed with the Department.

(d) Despite the lack of present organizational ties, support and sympathy with the aims of the world Communist movement. The Bureau's standard includes this point but is broader. Individuals are now placed on the Security Index who are present active participating members of the Communist Party or related groups or who actively espouse the line of those groups regardless of their individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities. However, membership in revolutionary or related groups is not a prerequisite for placing a name on the Security Index and even though there is absence of evidence of membership in revolutionary groups individuals are placed on the Security Index in those instances where the individuals are affiliated with a revolutionary group, are under its discipline or are closely associated with the organization.

#### Comment

The Department's standard calls for membership in the Communist Party prior to January 1, 1949, and authorized individuals to be included in the Security Index even though there is a lack of present organizational ties, but there is support and sympathy with the aims of the world Communist movement.

The Bureau has many individuals included in the Security Index where the actual Party membership was prior to January 1, 1949, and there has been no real activity in the Party developed since that date. In the absence of positive steps by the subject to disassociate himself from the Party, we keep him in the Security Index bearing in mind Party instructions as to "sleepers" and underground activities. This class of persons is not covered by the Department's standards and we are so pointing out to the Department.

The entire revised standard 5 requires membership in the Communist Party at any time prior to January 1, 1949. We have not limited this category to the Communist Party alone but have included any revolutionary organization or political party, and have not made evidence of membership a prerequisite providing an individual has been affiliated with and has been active in carrying out the aims and purposes of the revolutionary organization.



(b) A present position of importance in, or a substantial contribution to, any organization which is or can be used for Communist purposes.

Manual of Instructions, Section 87, Page 33, Item (c) provides that Party members who hold strategic positions in front organizations or other mass organizations, or in press, radio, motion picture, and other mass educational media, or otherwise are influential in organizing or mobilizing elements sympathetic to the Party for propagandizing its line or advancing its interests should be included in the Security Index.

(c) Present employment in or connection with a government or an industry or facility vital to the national defense, health and welfare.

The Manual of Instructions, Section 87, Pages 33, Items (h) and (i) provides that Party members employed in basic strategic or vital industry and Party members employed in municipal, state or federal governments or as organizers or officials of labor unions which include such employees in their memberships should be included in the Security Index.

#### Comment:

A variation in the Bureau's standards relating to (b) and (c) of the Department's standards is the fact that the Department's standards call for present activity in front organizations or employment in vital facilities, whereas we have many persons in the Security Index who met these standards at the time they were placed on the Security Index but we cannot show current activity or employment. We will discuss this with the Department.

In regard to revised category (c) there are probably many individuals who are presently employed in vital facilities who were members of revolutionary groups at some time prior to January 1, 1949 and there is no evidence of discontinuance except the absence of any reports or complaints of recent activity. Again, we have not automatically placed such individuals on the Index, but have evaluated each case on its merits. Actually the only way we could determine the identity of persons falling in that category would be to check the employment records of all vital facilities against our indices. This would be a tremendous undertaking if this standard is to be construed as a directive to the Bureau and is not construed under our concept.



DEPARTMENT STANDARDS

6. Actions and influence on essential membership subsequent to January 1, 1949, in two or more Communist dominated or infiltrated organizations and conduct therein indicative of substantial adherence to the objectives of the Communist Party.

BUREAU STANDARDS

Manual of Instructions, Section 87, Page 33, item (c) provides that Party members who hold strategic positions in front organizations or other mass organizations, or in press, radio, motion picture, and other mass educational media, or otherwise are influential in organizing or mobilizing elements sympathetic to the Party or in propagandizing its line or advancing its interests should be included in the Security Index.

SAC Letter Number 48 dated July 25, 1950, instructed the field to consider for the Security Index those individuals who actively espouse the line of the Communist Party or related groups, regardless of their individual leadership in the Communist Party or related groups, present employment or past activity.

Comment

The standards of the Department narrow the criterion used in determining what individuals should be included in the Security Index concerning individuals affiliated with front organizations and related groups. Under the Department's standard, membership in two or more Communist dominated or infiltrated organizations since January 1, 1949, and conduct therein indicative of substantial adherence to the objectives of the Communist Party is necessary. At the present time, and for a number of years, the Bureau has included in the Security Index individuals that have been associated with Communist dominated organizations where their activities were indicative of adherence to the objectives of the Communist Party even though they were not Communist Party members.

The potential dangerousness of the subject as reflected by his activities is the controlling factor rather than membership in two or more front groups subsequent to January 1, 1949. Inactivity since the latter date is not sufficient to remove a name from the Security Index under present Bureau standards, unless there is positive development justifying contrary action. We are pointing this out to the Department.



General Comments on the Department's Revised Standards

It is to be noted that the first three items of the revised Security Index standards as submitted by the Department stress cases relating to individuals involved in espionage, counterespionage and sabotage. In this regard the Bureau has not furnished to the Department reports on espionage subjects for security reasons when there is a possibility that the disclosure of such information will affect espionage parallel. Such individuals, of course, are carried in the Espionage Subdivisions of the Special Sections and their names are not included on the Security Index list periodically furnished to the Department.

It should be noted also that the Department's standards under items 3 to 6 inclusive set out above deal specifically with members of the Communist Party to which in one instance is added the world Communist movement and do not otherwise refer to additional Marxist-type or other revolutionary groups. As you are aware, the Bureau has included a number of individuals on the Security Index that are members of, or affiliated with, the Socialist Workers Party, the Independent Socialist League, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and so forth. These other revolutionary groups should be covered in the revised Security Index standards.

A large percentage of all Security Index subjects must come under items 4, 5 and 6 of the revised standards in which the Department indicates membership in the Communist Party or the Communist dominated or infiltrated organizations is a prerequisite. In many Security Index cases it has been impossible even after extensive investigation to establish evidence of membership in subversive organizations although the individuals are or have been affiliated with and engaged in activities in furtherance of the aims and purposes of the subversive groups and in carrying out the dictates of those groups, and there is no positive development that they have discontinued such associations. These individuals present a definite potential of dangerousness even though no membership can be established.

One class of cases which the Bureau is presently placing on the Security Index but which does not fall under any of the revised standards are those arising out of the Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency or "foreign intelligence" investigations. Names of individuals in this group are placed in the Security Index depending on the extent of available derogatory information even though no evidence of espionage



counterespionage, sabotage or Party membership is developed when:

1. Individuals or organizations are engaged in subversive activity in the United States having a definite foreign interest or connection contrary to the interests of the United States.
2. Individuals now in the United States having engaged in subversive activities abroad.
3. Members of foreign subversive organizations who are visiting or residing in the United States for any reason.
4. Individuals who maintain liaison or closely associate with members of foreign Legations, Embassies, or Missions in the United States who come within items 1, 2, and 3. These cases present a definite threat to the internal security of this country if the individuals are giving aid and comfort to the subversive individuals or organizations whose stand is against the interests of this country. A specific example of cases in this category are the employees of Tass and Amtorg.

Cases Presently on the Security Index for Which We do Place on the Security Index Which Will Not Come Under the Revised Security INDEX Standards:

Under present Bureau standards all persons are considered for the Security Index when an investigation reflects they are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each individual case has been considered on its own merits. Since July 25, 1950, we have considered for the Security Index individuals who are present active participating members of the Communist Party or related groups, other revolutionary groups, or who actively espouse the line of those groups regardless of the individual's leadership in the group, present employment or past activities. In addition the names of individuals are considered for the Security Index when there is evidence of past membership or affiliation with subversive groups coupled with training in those groups, employment in vital industries or defense installations, past service in the Armed Forces or similar categories when there is no positive development indicating the individuals have become disassociated with the subversive groups. Membership or past membership in a subversive group are not prerequisites for placing a name on the Security Index although in many cases this information is available.

An analysis of the full Bureau standards for placing the names of persons in the Security Index reflects that the Department's revised standards do not cover the following classes:



of persons either now in the Security Index or who do place in the Security Index in accordance with present Bureau standards.

1. Members or affiliates of revolutionary groups, other than the Communist Party, such as the Socialist Workers Party, the Independent Socialist League, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, the Proletarian Party of America, and the Revolutionary Workers League.
2. Individuals who are not members or affiliates of any organization cited as subversive by the Attorney General, but who should be considered dangerous or potentially dangerous in the event of an emergency, because of beliefs contrary to the interests of the United States and past acts of violence during strikes, riots and demonstrations.
3. Individuals who are presently affiliated with, and are engaging in or responding to the line of revolutionary organizations, but no evidence of membership in the organization has been developed.
4. Individuals who, prior to January 17, 1949, engaged in activities and activity sympathetic to and in furtherance of the aims and purposes of revolutionary organizations and considered dangerous or potentially dangerous due to training, employment in vital industries or defense installations, past services to the Armed Forces, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and OSS, access to explosives, chemicals, weapons or ammunition, experience as picket captains or strong arm men in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations, or a position in a mass organization of some kind where the affiliation or activities set out above will determine the destiny of the mass organization or other similar categories, but against whom membership in the revolutionary organization never has been established or any derogatory information developed since January 17, 1949.

Of course, this refers to cases in which there are no developments indicating disassociation with the beliefs of the organization.

In this same connection present position of importance in mass organizations sympathetic to, and carrying out the aims and purposes of the revolutionary organizations, and present employment in or connection with a vital facility or a defense installation are not necessary under present Bureau standards providing either of those elements were present at the time the individual's name



was placed on the Security Index several years ago.

The Department's revised standards contain the words "present" in this regard. We have not removed names from the Index that were fully justified when placed on it, merely because of inactivity or change in position or employment.

5. Individuals against whom membership in revolutionary groups has never been established, yet the individual, over an extended period of time, has been active and an influential member of, or has been affiliated with, organizations dominated or infiltrated by the revolutionary organization, and his activity or affiliation therein has been indicative of substantial adherence to the objectives of the revolutionary group, when:

- (1) There is lack of evidence of any membership or affiliation in a front group since January 1, 1949, or positive developments indicating that such membership or affiliation has been discontinued;
- (2) There is evidence of membership or affiliation in only one such infiltrated or dominated organization since January 1, 1949.

6. Individuals against whom no evidence has been developed of espionage, counterespionage, sabotage or membership in a revolutionary organization but where the individual:

- (1) Are engaged in subversive activity in the United States on the part of an individual or organization having a definite foreign interest or connection contrary to the interests of the United States;
- (2) Are the subjects of allegations of subversive activity abroad and are now in the United States;
- (3) Are members of foreign subversive organizations and are now residing or visiting in the United States and;
- (4) Are maintaining liaison or close association with members of foreign Legations, Embassies or Missions in the United States and come under 1, 2 and 3 above.





133  
changed to  
1-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: July 17, 1951

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Albany

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

As of July 15, 1951, the Security Index cards maintained in the Albany Office are in an up-to-date status and the addresses for all of these Security Index subjects have been verified within the past six months.

734  
changed  
to  
62-5X

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7/17/51

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : ALBUQUERQUE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC letter No. 100, series 1950 dated December 28, 1950, Section C.

This is to advise that all the security index cards in the Albuquerque office are in an up-to-date status and all security index subjects, with the exception of one, have been verified within the past six months. The verification of this subject's whereabouts is presently being made by the Albany office.

UNRECORDED

7-19-51

(B) LETTER FORWARDING SECURITY INDEX CARD - FORM FD-128 - SECURITY FLASH NOTICE -- When form FD-128 is used there should be typed on it advice as to whether a Security Flash Notice has been placed with the Identification Division. An additional copy should be specifically dispatched to the Identification Division in order that those records will reflect the new office controlling the existing Security Flash.

When form FD-128 is next printed, a space for this advice will be provided. It is desired that the supply of forms on hand be used.



UNRECORDED  
7-19-51

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
NO NUMBER  
SAC LETTER

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 19, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			


RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

A. Responsibility for the Custody of Persons Apprehended  
Under Emergency Detention Program

The Department has advised that the Bureau's responsibility for the custody of persons apprehended under the Emergency Detention Program terminates at the time persons are delivered, immediately after apprehension, to places of temporary detention which in most instances will be local jails, prisons or other institutions.

In event the place of temporary detention to which you deliver a subject arrested under the Program is a local jail, prison or other institution, responsibility for the subject's custody forthwith will be lodged in the United States Marshal of the district where the jail, prison or institution is located. The Department has advised that the office of the United States Marshal will be responsible for the payment of any fees charged by local authorities. The United States Marshal's responsibility will continue until final disposition in the matter and will include transportation to and from the place of hearings.

In event the place of temporary detention to which a detainee is delivered is an Army installation, the Army will be responsible for the custody of such person as of the time of delivery. Responsibility of the Army continues until final disposition of the



matter and includes transportation to and from the place of hearings. Under present instructions the Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and San Juan offices will deliver persons apprehended under the Program to Army authorities for temporary detention.

After final commitment under the Program, responsibility for custody of detainees will reside in the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice.

Under no circumstances should the plans for the Emergency Detention Program be discussed with anyone outside the Bureau and the above instructions in regard to custodial responsibilities for persons apprehended under the Program should not be discussed with United States Marshals, Army authorities or representatives of the Bureau of Prisons.

B. Receipt for Apprehended Person

Reference is made to instructions regarding the execution of the Receipt for Apprehended Person contained under "Detcom" in No Number SAC Letter dated August 15, 1950. Those instructions directed that in each case the form should be executed in quadruplicate, one copy to be furnished to the local jailor, two copies to be furnished the United States Attorney's office and one copy to be designated for the individual's case file.

In order to facilitate the notifying of United States Marshals that an individual apprehended under the Program has been placed in a local jail, prison or other institution, the above instructions are changed to require that the Receipt for Apprehended Person be executed in quintuplicate. In addition to the distribution of the copies as indicated above, one copy should be furnished to the appropriate United States Marshal following each arrest.

An appropriate notation should be placed on the original Receipt for Apprehended Person, which in each instance is designated for the individual's case file, indicating the distribution made of copies of this form.

C. Apprehensions - Presence of Special Agents at Each Apprehension or Search

In view of the complex nature of the Emergency Detention Program and the necessity that the Bureau retain full control of the entire Program, assignments should be arranged so that at least one Special Agent will be present at each apprehensions or search unless in outlying areas of your Field Division territory, where no Special Agent will be within striking distance, there is sound reason for effecting apprehensions or searches by police officers alone. Such



exceptions should be kept at a minimum. The Bureau should be advised by memorandum captioned "Detcom Survey" if any changes are made in your Detcom Survey plan as the result of these instructions.

D. Juveniles

Individuals who are on the Security Index and have not reached their eighteenth birthday at the time the Emergency Detention Program is placed in operation should be apprehended the same as adults. However, upon the apprehension of the juvenile under the Program the Special Agent making the apprehension shall immediately notify the United States Probation Officer and United States Marshal of the district in which the arrest is made furnishing information regarding the subject's age and place of temporary detention.

In preparing Form FD-167, Apprehension Notice and Register, in instances reporting the arrest of a Security Index subject who is a juvenile, a brief notation should be set out under "remarks" on all copies of this form to reflect that the subject is a juvenile and that the appropriate United States Marshal and United States Probation Officer have been advised in the matter.

At the present time, arrangements have been made for the Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and San Juan Offices to use Army detention facilities for the temporary detention of individuals arrested under the Program. In those Field Divisions or in any other Field Division where arrangements may be made subsequently for use of Army detention facilities, juveniles should not be delivered to Army authorities for temporary detention but should be delivered to local jails in order that the juveniles will be easily accessible to United States Marshals for detention at such places as the United States Probation Officer may direct.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7-19-51  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER  
Series 1951



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 72

Series 1951

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 21, 1951 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMO FOR MR.

(A) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - TRANSFERS OF KEY FIGURES AND TOP FUNCTIONARIES BETWEEN FIELD DIVISIONS -- In the past, when a Key Figure or Top Functionary has moved from the territory covered by one Division to that covered by another Division, the transfer of office of origin has been effected by Form FD-128. At the time of transfer the old office of origin has submitted a letter to the Bureau deleting the subject as a Key Figure or Top Functionary in that office and the subject has not been considered a Key Figure or Top Functionary in the new office of origin unless his activities warranted such designation and the Bureau was advised by separate communication. Many cases have automatically reverted to the Security Matter - C classification in the new office of origin and as such have been placed in a closed status without following the cases within a given period of time.

Effective upon receipt of these instructions such cases will be handled in the following manner.

When a Key Figure or Top Functionary moves from one Division to another, the old office of origin will handle the transfer of the case as it has in the past, transferring origin by Form FD-128 indicating on that form in the space provided thereon, that the subject was a Key Figure or Top Functionary. It will not be necessary for the old office of origin to advise the Bureau by separate letter of the deletion of the subject as a Key Figure or Top Functionary in that office. This deletion will be handled automatically in the old office of origin and at the Bureau upon submission of Form FD-128.

The new office of origin, upon receipt of Form FD-128, will automatically prepare a Key Figure or Top Functionary Card and will continue the case in an assigned pending-inactive status. Within six months in the cases of Key Figures or within three months in the cases of Top Functionaries, the new office of origin will conduct active investigation and submit an investigative report on the subject concerned. At that time a determination should be made as to whether the subject should continue to be designated as a Key Figure or Top Functionary and the Bureau shall be advised as to whether the subject will be continued in such designation or deleted as such.

RE: SECURITY INDEX - TABBING FOR DETCOM AND COMSAB

In the past, the Field has been submitting Forms FD-122 appropriately marked for Detcom and/or Comsab when it is desired that subjects receive priority designation for apprehension. These forms often carry a notation in the space provided thereon reflecting that the reason for so tabbing the Security Index Card is due to the employment of the subject in a vital facility. However, in many instances these forms have been received at the Bureau in cases where the subject is not strategically employed and no reason for the priority tabbing of the Security Index Card is apparent on the Form FD-122. This often necessitates a review of the subject's file at the Bureau before the Security Index Card can be appropriately tabbed.

Effective upon receipt of these instructions the following action should be taken when Forms FD-122 are submitted designating subjects for Detcom and/or Comsab.

A brief statement shall be typed on the lower portion of the Form FD-122 giving the reason for the tabbing of the Security Index Card. It is not necessary that this be a lengthy statement. For example, if the Security Index Card on a subject is being tabbed because the subject fought in the Spanish Civil War or is a Veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, you may merely state: "Fought in the Spanish Civil War" or "Member of Abraham Lincoln Brigade." Other examples might be: "Member of the armed forces World War II;" "Has received training in sabotage;" "Has stated will sabotage American defense effort in event of hostilities with Russia;" and so forth.

This procedure also applies when a subject's Security Index Card is being tabbed for priority apprehension because that subject is employed by a firm included in the Procli List. An appropriate statement in this instance would be: "Employed by firm on Procli List."

Henceforth, when you desire to delete the subject of a Security Index Card from the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications the word "delete" shall be typed in the appropriate spaces on the Form FD-122 following the words Detcom and/or Comsab which are

7-21-51  
SAC LETTER NO. 72  
Series 1951

printed on the FD-122. A brief statement shall be made at the bottom of the Form FD-122 giving your reason for the deletion. This statement should be brief. For example: "Subject no longer strategically employed."

Re: SECURITY INDEX - TRANSFERS OF SECURITY INDEX CARDS  
TABBED DETCOM AND COMSAB

In the past, when the office of origin has been changed in those instances where subjects of Security Index Cards have been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab in the old office of origin, the tabbing has been deleted from the Security Index Card at the Seat of Government and, in the absence of Form FD-122 from the new office of origin reinstating the priority designation, the Security Index Cards have remained untabbed.

Upon receipt of these instructions the following action will be taken in cases of this nature.

Upon the transfer of the office of origin of a subject who has been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab, the Security Index Card will remain tabbed in the new office of origin as it was in the old office of origin. This shall apply in all instances including cases concerning Key Figures and Top Functionaries as well as cases carried under the Security Matter - C classification or cases carried under any other character such as Espionage - R or Internal Security - R. The Security Index Card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in the new office of origin until such time as it is determined by that office that the priority designation is not warranted.

In those instances where the subjects were tabbed for priority apprehension in the old office of origin solely because of strategic employment and the subjects are no longer strategically employed in the new office of origin, it will be necessary for the new office of origin to submit Form FD-122 reflecting the deletion of the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications. This, of course, shall apply only in those instances where no other reasons are existent for continuing the subject under the priority designation.

735  
changed to  
43-12

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Minneapolis  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 23, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950, dated 12/28/50.

f-  
You are advised that addresses of all SI subjects  
have been checked within the past six months.

736  
changed  
to  
37-24

August 3, 1951

SAC, Philadelphia

Director, FBI

Security Index  
Ur file

Reference is made to your letter dated July 24, 1951, transmitting one roll of film pertaining to the above-captioned matter.

In accordance with your request, prints have been made and they are being forwarded to your office under separate registered cover.



736  
changed  
to  
37-24

0000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/24/51


FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ATTENTION: MECHANICAL SECTION

Transmitted under separate cover is one 25 foot roll of 35 mm. film which is exposed and undeveloped. This film contains photographs of reports in cases involving Security Index subjects. In accordance with Bureau instructions, duplicate copies of all reports were purged from the Philadelphia files. Subsequently, instructions were issued to maintain duplicate copies of reports in Security Matter and Internal Security cases, and the Bureau has recently advised that such duplicate copies should be available in the event it is necessary to furnish copies of reports to the United States Attorneys. Accordingly, the attached photographs have been made so that duplicate copies will be available in the files.

It is requested that one print of each exposure be made, 8 x 10 1/2 inches in size, and returned to the Philadelphia Office along with the exposed film. The attached film is non-evidentiary in nature and is being transmitted for processing only.



STANDARD FORM NO.

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: May 25, 1951

FROM : SAC, Denver

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION ARISING AT QUARTERLY  
CONFERENCE

During the Quarterly Agents Conference held in the office on 5/16/51 a discussion was had of the Detcom Program, during which time the possibility of numerous SI subjects fleeing and being the subject of search was brought up. The suggestion was made, first offered by SA

and concurred in by various others, that it likely will be worth our efforts to maintain information on license numbers on automobiles either owned or used by SI subjects, that these be kept posted on the SI cards. While it is realized this would entail considerable additional record keeping, nevertheless, if it does appear upon announcement of a national emergency any of these subjects would begin to flee or hide, this would provide information for the Bureau in locating them. The Bureau may wish to give further consideration to this suggestion.



*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 22, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARDS  
SUGGESTION NO. 772 from the DENVER OFFICE

PURPOSE

To recommend that the suggestion from the Denver Office for posting automobile license numbers on Security Index Cards not be adopted.

DETAILS

Suggestion No. 772 submitted by the Denver Office, memorandum dated May 25, 1951, attached.

Briefly the suggestion recommends that the license numbers on automobiles either owned or used by Security Index subjects be posted on the respective Security Index cards to provide information to assist in locating the subject should they attempt to flee or hide at the time of a national emergency.

OBSERVATION


It is not believed that this suggestion should be adopted, as the Denver Office points out such a procedure would entail considerable additional record keeping. Such information to be of any value at all would have to be kept in a current status at all times and there appears to be very little reason why such information should be placed on Security Index Cards. The limited number of instances when such information will be needed on a moment's notice is far offset by the tremendous investigative burden that would be placed on the Field to keep this information current.

It would appear that information concerning the means of transportation of a Security Index subject should more logically be placed in the case file along with other background information since if the subject cannot be located in an emergency the case file will have to be reviewed promptly in order to set out logical leads to locate the individual.

RECOMMENDATION

If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division to advise them that the Security Division recommends that the suggestion not be adopted. This matter is to be considered by the Joint Committee on June 30, 1951.

/





# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 7/8/51

FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #772  
EMPLOYEE: SA  
DENVER OFFICE  
MAINTAINING LICENSE NUMBERS  
OF AUTOMOBILES OWNED OR OPERATED  
BY SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

MEMBERS PRESENT: Messrs.

## SUGGESTION:

Automobile license numbers be posted to Security Index cards as an identification and apprehension aid.


The Internal Security Section of the Security Division was opposed to the suggestion, pointing out it would entail considerable additional record keeping, not justified by the benefits to be received.

## JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

The Joint Committee felt that the license number of the Security Index subject's car was just one of many things which could be placed on a Security Index card, but the intention is to keep the Security Index card brief; reduce bookkeeping; reduce extraneous work; and to concentrate on including in the investigation file only information which will be helpful in locating subjects.

The Joint Committee further pointed out information appearing on Security Index cards must be kept up to date and the more items placed on these cards, the greater the task of keeping them up to date.

The Joint Committee on 6/20/51, recommended unanimously unfavorably as to the suggestion for the reason stated above.



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 73  
Series 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 24, 1951

MEMO FOR MR.

- (A) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS-SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS -- Your attention is directed to Title II, Section 109, (h) (3), of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which states that:

"In deciding the question of the existence of reasonable ground to believe a person probably will engage in or conspire with others to engage in espionage or sabotage, the Attorney General, any preliminary hearing officer, and the Board of Detention Review are authorized to consider evidence of ----- activity in espionage or sabotage operations of, or the holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or of any of its subdivisions and the substitution therefor of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government."

Standards for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index are now broadened to include persons holding at any time after January 1, 1949, membership in any organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions and the substitution therefor of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government.

It is realized that many cases falling in this category probably have been opened in your office since receipt by you of copies of the Internal Security Act of 1950. However, effective

immediately, you should cause a check to be made of your office records for the purpose of opening cases on individuals who have been reported as having been members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949. All individuals falling in this category who are not now on the Security Index in your office should be afforded current investigation and should be considered for inclusion in the Security Index as soon as possible.

In order that you may open such cases where Security Index cards are not now in existence, it is suggested that you: (1) Review all individual security cases which have been opened in your office since January 1, 1949. (2) Review your file from January 1, 1949, to date. (3) Check your Communist index for the names of persons reported as members of such organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949. You should also include in your check any other files in your office which you believe may contain information pertinent to the above instructions.

It is not intended that the investigations you open as a result of these instructions include investigations of individuals who have been reported solely as having membership or activity in the organizations commonly known as front organizations between January 1, 1949, and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950.

It is rather intended that the investigations opened as a result of these instructions be confined to individuals reported as members of the basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, etc.

These instructions do not supplant the instructions set forth in SAC Letter Number 48 (B), dated July 25, 1950, pertaining to individuals who, subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, have continued to be active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups and who actively espouse the line of those groups regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities. Standards for investigation of and inclusion in the Security Index of persons falling within this group remain the same.

The review of your files and the opening of cases on the individuals affected by these instructions must be completed immediately. The investigations of these individuals must be completed as soon as possible.

Henceforth, in keeping with the above instructions, when you currently receive information through your confidential sources or from individual complainants which allege membership in the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949, the individuals concerned should be investigated and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index.

It is not desired that you open cases for investigation on the information currently received alleging subversive activities on the part of individuals prior to January 1, 1949, unless those allegations go beyond mere membership or association with the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations and include information such as involvement in espionage, special training in a subversive movement, membership in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, training in the Armed Forces, Reserve Officer status, current employment in vital industry, or include other factors rendering the individuals as particularly dangerous. If such factors are present the subject should be investigated and considered for inclusion in the Security Index. During the above-requested review you should be alert for information of this nature already in your files pertaining to persons on whom you have not previously opened investigations.

In connection with the above, I desire to call your attention to allegations which are received in matters of this nature from persons who do not disclose their identities. Complaints received from anonymous individuals should not be disregarded. If the facts of the complaint are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation and the allegations place the subject within the categories referred to above wherein we would otherwise conduct investigation, investigation should be conducted just as it would be if the identity of the source were known to the Bureau.

You are to advise the Bureau by separate letter under the caption "Security Investigations of Individuals-Security Index Standards" when you have completed the review of your files requested herein. At that time you should inform the Bureau of the total number of cases which you have opened pursuant to these instructions.

*list*

739

Mr. Peyton Ford  
Deputy Attorney General

July 25, 1951

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INDEX LIST

- GENERAL

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of individuals maintained in the Security Index. This list is subdivided alphabetically under the field offices of this Bureau covering the residence of the individuals listed.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment


NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Special Section-Espionage not furnished to Department.

*List Personnelly  
delivered to Col.  
N. M. ... - Dept.  
Old list obtained  
& destroyed 7-26-51*

RECEIVED RECORDS SECTION  
FBI  
JUL 24 3 14 PM '51

RECORDED - 71  
EX - 100  
JUL 28 1951  
13



740  
changed  
to  
56-10

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI


DATE: July 24, 1951

FROM : *F* SAC, NORFOLK

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC letter Number 100 dated December 28, 1950.

All security index cards in this office are  
up to date and addresses for all security index subjects  
have been checked within the last six months.



41 changed to 9-19

1000 1000  
 1000 1000

1. *Introduction*

10

...the subject has moved or has changed employment within the six month period, the case is re-opened to ascertain such as expeditiously as possible.

742  
changed  
to  
15-17

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 27, 1951

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 20, Series 1951.

The last paragraph of Section A of referenced letter requested that the Bureau be advised when the last of these required reports had been submitted.

This is to advise that of the 47 reports required by referenced letter, 44 have been submitted. The remaining three are now being prepared.





743

list

SAC, Omaha

July 25, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
 REGISTERED MAIL  
 AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY  
 RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

ReBulet dated December 29, 1950.

There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.

The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.


Enclosure

RECORDED - 53

JUL 27 1951

EX - 63

497500



RECEIVED  
 JUL 28 1951  
 A.B.



144 changed  
to  
41-11

STANDARD FORM NO.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7-26-51

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARDS  
Up To Date Status

In compliance with instructions contained in SAC letter #100 dated 12-28-50, this is to advise as of this date all Security Index cards maintained in the Richmond Office are in an up to date status. In addition, the data appearing on these cards has been checked within the last six months period.

Office Memorandum

m • UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 12, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Summary of General

Reference is made to the request from Inspector to attempt to locate a public statement by the Director to the effect that the FBI had the Communists under surveillance and could arrest them on short notice.

The Director's testimony before Congressional committees for the fiscal years 1950, 1951 and 1952 has been reviewed with negative results. In addition, available material in the Bureau library and the Crime-Records Section for roughly the last 2½ years has also been reviewed without success.

It is not felt that anything can be found of public record containing a statement to this effect. It will be recalled, however, that after the Director's appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee in the Spring some unnamed Senator leaked information to the press that the Bureau was prepared to pick up some 14,000 members of the Communist Party. It is my understanding that the Director did make such a statement off the record before the Senate Appropriations Committee and that he also used the same material when talking to the Governors who visited the Bureau on January 26, 1951.

It will be noted on page 20 of the attached material for the Director's testimony in connection with the 1951-1952 Supplemental Appropriation Requests the following is set forth:

"The Bureau has maintained close investigative coverage on 14,549 of the more important figures in the Communist Party and related potentially dangerous subversives.

"(a) - The 14,549 figure represents those listed for apprehension in the event of a National Emergency under the Bureau's Security Index Program."

The same figure, 14,549, appears on page 208 of the attached material prepared for the Director's use in connection with the regular Appropriations Request.

It should be noted that the Director, in his interview with the U. S. News & World Report, published March 30, 1951, (copy attached), stated that with 48,217 Communist Party members and only 5,200 agents, it was a physical impossibility to keep all of them under surveillance.

746  
changed  
to  
16-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 19, 1951


OHV FROM : SAC, El Paso

SC SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

CONFIDENTIAL

Re mylet July 9, 1951.

This is to advise that the residence address of  
has been verified and the Bureau appropriately  
advised.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 20, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE

Index.

To advise you of the total cards in the Security

DETAILS

During the past week, 58 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 50 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,422.

748  
changed  
to  
26-20

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Los Angeles  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 10, 1951

Reference SAC Letter Number 100, Series 1950, paragraph C, with respect to the necessity of maintaining information on the Security Index Cards in an up-to-date status and checking addresses of Security Index subjects at least once every six months.

This office has at the present time 2004 active Security Index Cards. The procedure presently followed in this office is to verify the information on approximately one-sixth of the Security Index Cards each month. The information on all Security Index Cards in this office has been checked within the past six months or is in the process of verification.

UNRECORDED  
7-18-51



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

ATTENTION  
CONFIDENTIAL  
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAC LETTER NO. 70  
Series 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 18, 1951

MEMO FOR MR.

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF  
INDIVIDUALS - PHOTOGRAPHS OF  
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

You are reminded of the provisions of Section 87-C, pages 34 and 35 of the Manual of Instructions, which require that a photograph be placed on the reverse side of the original Security Index card maintained in the field office.

The Bureau recently had occasion to issue eight Identification Orders on subjects of security investigations and it was found that in some cases current reproducible photographs were not immediately available. While it is not desired that an investigation be maintained in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining a photograph, you are instructed to intensify your efforts and exhaust all logical leads in an attempt to obtain pictures during the course of your investigation. After a photograph has been obtained you should continue to be alert for the existence of more recent pictures which may become available.



*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Charlotte  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: July 12, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter #100 dated December 28, 1950.

Please be advised that all security index subjects have been checked and are in up-to-date status. The addresses and employments have been checked within the past six months.





750  
changed  
to

33-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED

GOVE

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, New Orleans  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION

DATE: July 19, 1951

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter No. 100 dated December 28, 1950.

This is to advise that the home addresses and employment addresses of all Security Index subjects in the New Orleans Division were confirmed during February and March, 1951. In addition, all Security Index subjects were personally observed by an agent of this office to whom the individual case files were assigned for that purpose at that time.

75/  
changed  
to  
47-27

*Rel*  
SAC, San Francisco

July 19, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
PHOTOGRAPHS OF SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
SAC LETTER NUMBER 40 DATED 7-18-51

Your attention is directed to the above-captioned SAC Letter, a copy of which is enclosed.

You are requested to give this matter your immediate personal attention with respect to the photo in question so that as many copies as possible of the letter will reach the Bureau to the attention of Assistant Director no later than Thursday, July 23, 1951.

San Francisco should prepare the desired summaries on the following:

Los Angeles should prepare the desired summaries on the following:



*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


FROM : SAC, San Antonio

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: Jan. 3, 1953

Re Section C of SAC Letter No. 100, Series 1950.

The Bureau is hereby advised that the residence and business addresses of all security index card subjects in the San Antonio Division are in an up to date status and are being checked every six months. Administrative ticklers have been set up on the files of all security index card cases for this purpose.



753  
changed  
to  
16-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, El Paso

DATE: August 4, 1951

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF  
INDIVIDUALS - SECURITY INDEX  
STANDARDS

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

Please be advised that an appropriate review of the files of the El Paso Office has been made and as a result of this review three additional cases have been opened.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 27, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 57 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 49 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,471.



755

*Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*

TO :

DATE: May 24, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX  
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

## PURPOSE:

To advise you the action taken concerning certain recommendations set forth in attached memorandum of Executives Conference May 11, 1951.

## DETAILS:

The Executives Conference on May 11, 1951, considered a number of problems relating to the Security Index and made certain recommendations as follows:

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2.

The Executives Conference unanimously approved that the Bureau go on record again with the Department requesting specifically that there be a review of the reports previously submitted to the Department in order to obtain the Department's approval for those names which the Bureau has already listed on the Security Index, a copy of which is furnished to the Department monthly.


There is attached a letter to the Department in accordance with your recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5.

The Executives Conference unanimously was of the opinion that the names of prominent individuals should be retained in the Security Index and that the Department should be requested to review the reports concerning these individuals for the purpose of indicating their approval.

The letter to the Department previously referred to covers this situation.

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The Executives Conference in considering recommendation No. 2 suggested that just as soon as the Department approved a name being on the Security Index, the Security Index card on such subject would then be removed to a special section of the Security Index labelled "Approved by the Department." The Security Division is in full agreement with the recommendation of the Executives Conference; however, certain difficulties arise in the physical functioning of the Security Index, which are set forth hereinafter. The Security Index is arranged alphabetically and each time a separate section is set up it necessitates placing a dummy card containing the name of the individual and the designated special section in order that a name will not be missed when a search of the Security Index is made.

Unless this dummy card is prepared, it would be necessary to make two searches each time that a name is searched in the Index.

OBSERVATIONS:

In order to accomplish the purpose suggested by the Executives Conference, inquiry has been made of Mr. Statistical Section, and he has advised that an appropriate notation "Approved by the Department" can be placed on the Security Index card by the IBM machine, which is used to prepare the Security Index cards. He has also advised that by using this method it will be possible to furnish the number of individuals that have been approved by the Department and the names of the individuals that have been approved at any time this information is desired.

ACTION:

The attached letter will be sent to the Department if you approve.

If you agree to the observations made concerning the handling of the Security Index cards on those individuals which have been approved by the Department, the appropriate notation will be made on the Security Index card rather than removing them from the regular section of the Security Index.



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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: June 25, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX  
 SECURITY FLASH NOTICES - SUGGESTION No. 770  
 Bufile

PURPOSE

To recommend that the suggestion from the San Francisco Office on a procedure for changing Security Flash Notices be adopted.

DETAILS

Suggestion No. 770 was submitted by the San Francisco Office by memorandum dated May 22, 1951, attached.

Briefly the suggestion recommends that Form FD-128 be amended to include a notation that a Security Flash has been placed by the Office surrendering origin and that when the form is received at the Bureau it be routed to the Identification Division in order that their records can be changed to reflect the office currently having an interest and responsibility in the matter. San Francisco points out that this will eliminate the necessity of the office surrendering origin to write a separate memorandum to the Identification Division indicating the change in interest.

For your information, Form FD-128 is a form used in security cases to change the office of origin. It is used in all security cases whether or not the subject's name is carried in the Security Index. A copy of this form is attached. You will note that there are various items to be checked off by the office surrendering origin. This is done for the information of the new office of origin and the Bureau. Security Flash Notices are placed only in Security Index cases when it has been determined that the Security Index subject has positively been identified with a fingerprint record. The number of Security Flash Notices on file with the Identification Division is only a very small percentage of the entire Security Index because in many cases no fingerprint record is located.

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OBSERVATION

This suggestion has merit.

Reasons in Support of Suggestion

1. By checking a line which can be added to Form FD-128 the office surrendering origin can notify the new office of origin that a Security Flash Notice is on file at the Identification Division thus eliminating the necessity of a file review by the new office of origin to determine that fact.
2. By having an item referring to a Security Flash Notice on Form FD-128, the Agent supervising the case at the office surrendering origin is put on notice to check to see if a Security Flash Notice is on file.
3. If information appears on the FD-128 it can be routed by the Security Index Desk to the Identification Division to change the interest on the Security Flash Notice thus eliminating the necessity of the office surrendering origin writing to the Identification Division by separate memoranda to have the change of interest noted on the Security Flash.

Although no actual record is kept as to the number of individual memoranda received by the Identification Division changing the office having the interest, at the most only two or three such memoranda are received each day from the entire Field. Nevertheless, any savings in personnel time should be considered providing it is not offset by other reasons. Of course, any such information appearing on the FD-128 must contain the FBI number identified with the subject so that the change can be expeditiously handled by the Identification Division

Reasons Against the Suggestion


This change will not affect the Identification Division's operations in this matter. The only data appears on the form such as the FBI number. It will require, however, that each FD-128 received by the Security Division changing the office of origin in a Security Index case will have to be reviewed at the Security Index Desk to determine if a copy of the form should be routed to the Identification Division for appropriate action. This will entail a certain amount of additional work but it can be handled by clerical personnel. It is not believed that this additional work at the Security Index Desk will offset the three reasons in support of the suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the suggestion be adopted. At the present time there is approximately a six-month supply of Form FD-128 on hand at the Bureau and, of course, Field Offices have supplies of these forms on hand. Rather than changing the contents of this form by reprinting the form at this time, it is suggested that the Field be instructed to type on the form the necessary information in cases when a Security Flash Notice is on file until the present supply of this form is exhausted. At such time as it is necessary to reprint Form FD-128 the information regarding Security Flash Notices can be included on the form.

ACTION

If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division inasmuch as the suggestion is scheduled for consideration at the next meeting of the Joint Conference.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

The captioned individual has been the subject of a security investigation by this office. The \_\_\_\_\_ Division has verified the permanent presence of the subject in its division as residing and working at the addresses listed below. The \_\_\_\_\_ Division is being considered the new office of origin.

Residence Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Business Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Check the following applicable statements:


- This individual has been the subject of a Communist Index Card.
- This individual is the subject of a Security Index Card.
- (The Bureau is requested to make the appropriate changes in the Security Index at the Seat of Government. The \_\_\_\_\_ Division should affix the addresses reflected above and the appropriate case file number.)
- This subject was tabbed for Detcom.
- This subject was tabbed for Comsab.
- This subject was carried as a Key Figure or Top Functionary.
- Handwriting specimens have been furnished to the Bureau.
- A photograph has been furnished to the Bureau.

The following pertinent items are being forwarded to the new office of origin with its copies of this letter:

- Security Index Cards
- Serials (specify)

R U C

cc: \_\_\_\_\_ Division (Enc.)



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: August 3, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX — 16,547

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 92 new cards were added to the Security Index and 16 cards were canceled, a net increase of 76 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,547.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum*

*James* • UNITED

GOVERNMENT.

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 10, 1951

FROM : SAC, *Albany*


SUBJECT: *Albany* SIGN WITH INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SUBJECTS OF SECURITY CONCERNS

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter #72, Series 1951 dated 7-24-51.

This is to advise that all cases opened in this office since July 1, 1949 concerning Communists and like matters, as well as all *Albany* files, have been checked in accordance with re SAC letter.

As a result of this check, 17 cases are being re-opened for further investigation and subjects of these files will be considered for inclusion on the Security Index.



750A

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 5-10-51

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

The Security Index Program has been reviewed, in accordance with your instructions. Conferences have been held with and supervisors of the Security Division. Suggestions and recommendations are set forth. The survey was conducted by Inspector

## SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF INDEX

The Security Index contains approximately 15,390 names of which over 14,000 are Communists. At the Seat of Government, names are divided into the General Section and the Special Section. Cancelled cards are maintained in an Inactive Section on IBM Cards. In the Field, all names on the Security Index are maintained in an Alphabetical Section. A duplicate card on each subject is maintained in a Geographical Section, from which it is contemplated that the Field will make arrests. Cards duplicating those in the Special Section at the Bureau are likewise set aside in a Special Section in each office, as a sub-division of the Geographical Section, for special handling.

The 5x8 Index Cards contain the name, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency, whether subject is tabbed for Datcom (top functionaries, key figures and others designated for priority arrest), or Comsab (subjects with the training or opportunity to commit sabotage), or Special Section, office of origin, sex, race, place and date of birth, whether key figure or top functionary, Bureau file number, vital facility code, occupation and employment address, residence, and serial number assigned to subject by Statistical Section. This information, although partly abbreviated, can be read by anyone with elementary knowledge of the Program. All of this information is typed on cards mechanically from IBM punched cards and all 5x8 cards are supplied to both the Field and the Security Division by the Statistical Section. New cards are prepared when a change is necessary. The information on the card is limited by space, as well as by time necessary to prepare IBM cards and run them back through the tabulator. It is necessary to prepare a minimum of 5 IBM cards for each subject at the present time, due to the limitations of the IBM machines which can handle only a limited number of letters or figures on each card. Each additional item on the index card entails additional work, which must be weighed against the value of the information.

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New names are being added at the rate of approximately 100 weekly. Eight to 12 are removed weekly. Tabulating machines run new lists of all Security Index subjects monthly. A copy of each list is furnished the Department each month and the old list is placed in for destruction. A copy of each list is also furnished the Office to safeguard against loss of the information in event of destruction of records in Washington. This list shows only the name, office of origin, sex, race and date of birth, due to the mechanical limitations of the tabulator upon which it is prepared. It also appears to have sufficient information for the Department. A list of espionage subjects carried in the Security Index is not furnished the Department for security reasons.

#### STANDARDS FOR PLACING NAMES IN THE SECURITY INDEX

In reply to an inquiry from Mr. Peyton Ford on 9-13-49, the Bureau advised on 9-16-49, that the basic qualification for inclusion of a name in the Security Index was that such individual was potentially dangerous or would be dangerous in event of an emergency. Two elements were considered in measuring dangerousness:

- (1) Membership affiliation or activity indicating sympathy with the principle tenets of the Communist Party or similar ideological groups and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; and,
- (2) A showing of 1 or more of the following:
  - (a) Activity in the organization, promoting its aims and purposes;
  - (b) Training in the organization, indicating a knowledge of its ultimate aims and purposes;
  - (c) A position in a mass organization of some kind where his affiliation or sympathy as set forth in element (1) will determine the destiny of the mass organization;
  - (d) Employment or connection with an industry or facility vital to the national defense, health and welfare;
  - (e) Possessing a potential for committing espionage or sabotage.

758X

The Department was advised that no individual was included in the Index until such person had been investigated by the field, and that copies of reports of investigation of all individuals included in the Index have been furnished to the Department. The Department was advised that deletions are made from the Index of an individual no longer fits the standards for inclusion.

From April 1945 to July 25, 1950, membership alone in a subversive organization, without additional information indicating dangerousness, was not sufficient either to require a security investigation or to support a recommendation for a Security Index Card. There are, therefore, thousands of Communist Party members, reported during this 5-year period, who have never been investigated from a security standpoint. On 7-25-50, the Field was instructed to open investigations on individuals who were presently active, participating members of the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups or were affiliated with or espoused the lines of those groups. This alone is now considered sufficient basis for placing an individual in the Index, since his convictions are considered strong enough to make him potentially dangerous during an emergency. The Department has been advised of the broadened standards.

Recommendations for placing names in the security index originate in the field, although in practice, reviewers at the Seat of Government from time to time suggest to the field that a particular subject be considered for the Index on appropriate recommendation made.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECURITY INDEX SUBJECT SUGGESTED

Copies of reports on all individuals, except espionage subjects, are furnished to the Department. No systematic review of these reports has been made by the Department. A plan for the review of 2,000 of these reports has been announced by the Department, to begin in the near future. Should an emergency arise in the meantime, the plan calls for the inclusion of the names in the Security Index on a mass warrant, authorizing their arrest. This would mean that the Department would have relied entirely upon the FBI both to gather and to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. This is contrary to the basic concept of American judicial procedure and is a departure from usual policy of the Bureau which requires that a representative of the Department, either in the Field or at Washington, shall have reviewed the facts before authorizing process. It means also that, without having been taken before a Judge or U. S. Commissioner, a subject may be imprisoned for a period of time without a hearing of any kind and solely upon the judgment of the FBI. Technically, the FBI would have the authorization of the Department, but practically the Department would not be familiar with the evidence in any but a few cases.

SUGGESTION #1

That the Bureau go on record by requesting the Department to pass upon each name placed on the Security Index.

Advantages

1. By following this policy, the Bureau would not be open to an allegation of using Police State tactics.
2. The Department would serve as the sounding board for the evidence prior to its submission to an Administrative Board or Court, and this is the only outside agency open to the Bureau at this time.
3. In any investigation by Congressional Committees, the Bureau would be in a stronger position if it could be pointed out that the Department had reviewed and passed upon the evidence in each case.
4. Upon asking for a Joint resolution to approve any extraordinary measures taken by the President at the request of the Department, during an emergency, it would be in a better position, in replying to whatever opposition develops, to be able to point out that the judicial processes have been observed at least until the actual emergency. //

Disadvantages

1. The Bureau is in a better position to judge the value of the evidence and the background of the individual. Unless reviewing attorneys are well versed in Communist background and have the subject's Security uppermost in their mind, many of the subjects' names may be removed from the index.
2. Evidence in many of the files is no longer current, and numerous requests would be received from the Department to bring the files up-to-date before the Department would pass on the information. This work the Bureau has attempted to postpone until all currently active members have been investigated.
3. When the Department declines to authorize the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, the Bureau will be faced with removing it, although still of the conviction that the subject is potentially dangerous. Additional investigation may be requested, which will require time.
4. The security of the country may be jeopardized as a result of the Department's decision to remove some names from the Security Index. The Bureau will undoubtedly be held responsible by the American public for any failure to pick up individuals later proved dangerous.
5. It will not be possible for the Department to complete a review on all subjects for a considerable period of time, during which the Bureau would, of course, continue to operate under the present instructions of the Department to pick up all individuals on the list furnished to the Department by the Bureau.

Conclusion

In spite of the disadvantages, it appears that on a long-range basis, and considering the various phases of the question, the sounder procedure would be to refer each name to the Department for consideration before including it in the Security Index.

RECOMMENDATION "1"

*Done to Soviet*  
It is recommended that the Bureau request the Department to review the file on each subject whose name is included in the Security Index, with the exception of liaison subjects, and to expressly advise the Bureau concerning the retention of the name

STANDARD FOR REMOVAL OF NAMES

Generally, a subject's name is removed from the Index on the recommendation of the Field, when it appears that his activities no longer warrant his inclusion. Sufficient reasons for removal are death, desertion, imprisonment for several years, enlistment in the U. S. Armed Forces and defection, coupled with complete cessation. Mere lack of evidence of activity in recent years is not considered sufficient justification for removal. Each subject must be interviewed before his name may be removed from the Index, unless a valid reason exists for not doing so.

At the present time the Bureau does not advise the Department when a name has been removed from the Index. This procedure is in accordance with the unanimous recommendation of the Executives Conference. Since the only list maintained by the Department is the current list furnished by the Bureau, specific advice has not been necessary. As the Department reviews our files and approves a name for the Index, it is possible it may learn of compiling its own Security Index list. It may then be necessary to advise the Department of any name removed.

SUGGESTION #2

That Departmental authority be obtained for each name removed.

Advantages

1. The Bureau would then be following the usual legal procedure of having the Department, in fact, authorize dismissal of process. The entire responsibility would be on the Department.
2. No allegation of Police State tactics, bias or capriciousness could then be leveled at the Bureau for failure to pick up an individual formerly on the Index.
3. No discrepancies would then exist between the Bureau's list and any Departmental list, which might cause confusion and embarrassment.

Disadvantage

1. A number of the Bureau's informants, if not disclosed, where sufficient reason for removal, other than cooperation, could not be given.

Conclusion

By analogy to criminal cases, all names which have been placed on the Security Index with constitutional authority, should likewise be removed only upon Departmental authority.

RECOMMENDATION #2

It is recommended that each name suggested for removal from the Security Index be furnished to the Department by the Bureau with a request that the Department advise whether the name should be removed from the Security Index.

SPECIAL SECTION OF SECURITY INDEX

You inquired as to why we don't include everybody who should be taken as to the individual's service in the Special Section.

There are 230 names in this section, divided as follows: Espionage 62; Prominent Individuals 33; Pro-Tito Yugoslavs 10; Foreign Government Employees 27; United Nations Employees 24; Atomic Energy Program Employees 10; and U. S. Government Employees 24. Under present instructions, the field may not pick up these individuals except upon specific authorization of the Bureau.

Copies of reports on all individuals in the Special Section, except Espionage subjects, have been sent to the Department, or the Department is aware of their inclusion in the Security Index. The Department has authorized the immediate arrest, upon the declaration of an emergency, of United Nations employees, Atomic Energy Program employees and U. S. Government employees. Immediate arrest, however, is not contemplated by the Security Division for the reasons set forth under each category.

Espionage Subjects: Security of operations. Arrest and apprehension might jeopardize investigations under way at time emergency is declared. The reason is sound and no change should be made in procedure.

\* \* \* \* \*

Pro-Tito Yugoslavs: Status of these individuals can probably be determined only at the last minute by the policy of Yugoslavia or the conduct of the individual. Yugoslavia now appears to be anti-Russia, and nothing would be gained by picking up Yugoslavs on the basis of nationality alone.

\* \* \* \* \*

Foreign Government Employees: Their status changes from time to time, from a friendly to an unfriendly one, depending upon the relations existing between the foreign government and the United States at the time of the emergency. Consultation with the State Department or classification of the country is required for arrests.

GENERAL SECTION

It is requested that you advise the Bureau of any changes in the status of foreign governments in the General Section.



United Nations Employees: Although the Bureau is not responsible for immediate apprehension, this is a factor in the planning of their apprehension.

feels the Bureau should be kept advised of the apprehension of possible international problems.

#### Disadvantage

In order to be effective, notice must be given sufficiently in advance to permit the State Department to be brought into the matter and advise the Bureau. This would require an indefinite period, during which the subjects would have the opportunity to do the damage the program is designed to prevent.

#### RECOMMENDATION #4

That the Bureau direct the Field to take these persons into custody at the time the general notice for other arrests is issued.

\* \* \* \* \*

Atomic Energy Program Employees: It feels we should notify the Atomic Energy Commission prior to the apprehension of AEC employees and that the Bureau should be in a position to again review the files prior to apprehension.

#### Disadvantage

The delay might be costly, since investigation has indicated these subjects will be a liability rather than an asset during an emergency. The sooner they are picked up the better.

#### RECOMMENDATION #5

That the Bureau direct the Field to take these persons into custody at the time the general notice is issued.

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U. S. Government Employees: It is believed we should notify the appropriate Federal agencies prior to apprehension, and that the Bureau should be in a position to again review the files prior to apprehension. It also feels that the Federal Security Boards have passed on Government employees who are in the Security Index and that the Bureau would in effect be covering the Federal Boards.

Disadvantage.

A delay in the arrest of these people, if such a delay be more dangerous than delaying the right of to be in the Index, much as they are potential, if not actual, traitors, is expected to attempt as much damage as possible. The fact that names still remain in the Security Index is the strongest argument for disregarding any action by Loyalty Boards. Outside of any protocol, the notification would serve no practical purpose and notification following arrest should serve to maintain normal relations with other agencies.

RECOMMENDATION #6

That Government employees be picked up without delay following the general notice to the field.

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Prominent Individuals: This category apparently has afforded more difficulty than any other. The field was instructed in March of this year to prepare prosecutive-type summaries on each and to submit reports at least each 6 months thereafter.

SUGGESTION #3

That the Department be requested specifically to review the reports on each so-called Prominent Individual, along with others being reviewed at this time.

Disadvantage

' points out that this move would show indecision on our part, whereas our position has been that we are better fitted to say who should be in the Index. As previously pointed out, however, the Bureau has already made the decision to include these names in the Index and the Department has been so advised.

Advantage

By calling the Department's attention to these names, we would be using the only agency available to test the evidence. If the facts will not pass this test, it is unlikely they will get up before an Administrative Board or Court and the names could be removed from the Index until more evidence is available.

PLC - 10/11/12

[illegible]

### DECLARATION OF INTEREST

It is recommended that the request for approval of the Special Section in the field set forth in the attached be approved to facilitate the supervision and in the field.

Consideration should be given to relieving the staff of the subseries on all Security Index subjects. In the long run, of course, this would call for an expenditure of time which cannot be afforded now, when every effort is being made to investigate new subjects for inclusion in the Security Index.

As a long-term proposition, summaries should be presented on all Security Index subjects.

1. Review in the Field, at the best of Government and in the Department would be facilitated.
2. Hearing Boards would be assured of having all pertinent evidence readily available.

Time consumed in reviewing reports on subjects already included in the index can be more productive in new investigations.

All Offices should be instructed to prepare summaries on all subjects presently under investigation who are to be recommended for inclusion in the Security Index.

As time permits, similar reports should be prepared on all Security Index subjects.

DETCON: FIELD INSTRUCTIONS

By no number SAC Letter Oct 22-1-56, SACs were instructed to revise all reports on the details of the Detcon Program, except for certain in which SACs are indicated definite assignments of duties in connection with the Program, including assignment of subjects for review. A number of new Agents have been sent to the field since that date, and new subjects added to the Security Index.

RECOMMENDATION "11

That every SAC be instructed to review with all Agents the Detcon Program and bring up-to-date every assignment in connection with the Program.

RECOMMENDATION "12

That Inspectors check into the adequacy of instruction on the Program during each inspection.

RECOMMENDATION "13

That the Security Index be placed on the agenda of each Regional SAC Conference.

757

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDLX -  
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

DATE: 5-11-51

The Executives Conference on May 11, 1951, consisting of Messrs.

considered suggestions arising as a result of a survey of policy and procedures in handling the Security Index files of the Bureau.

## BACKGROUND

There are over 15,300 names in the Security Index. At the Seat of Government there is a General Section and a Special Section. The Special Section is made up of cards on 230 individuals. There is attached a sample of a Security Index card and a sample alias card on blue.

In the Field, all names on the Security Index are maintained in an Alphabetical Section. A duplicate card is maintained in a Geographical Section, from which it is expected that the Field will make the arrests when the time comes. In the Field, there is a duplicate of the cards in the Special Section for special handling in keeping with Bureau instructions.

Approximately 100 new cards are added weekly. From 6 to 12 cards are removed weekly. The Department is furnished a list of the Security Index subjects (except subjects in espionage cases for security reasons) each month, and as the new list is furnished, the old list is picked up.

In reply to an inquiry from the Department, the Bureau advised the Department on 9-16-49 as to the standards used by the Bureau in placing an individual's name in the Security Index. A word has been received as to whether these standards were agreed to or were unacceptable. The Bureau applies these standards to the individuals, decides what cases to open and investigate, and determines what names are to be placed in the Security Index. In the event of war, the Bureau would make the arrests, and the Bureau would place the individuals in a place of confinement. By virtue of the fact that the Bureau told the Department what the standards were for Security Index listing, and as the Bureau is handling all the other matters involved, it is almost as if one agency were handling

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investigating, prosecuting, judging, arresting and placing in confinement. This places the Bureau in a very undesirable position as far as its own interests are concerned, and since the majority of those on the Security Index are American citizens, there is a great deal of danger to the Bureau's prestige involved.

In the event of a war and the arrest of those on the Security Index list, if the war should be reasonably short due to atomic weapons, we could soon thereafter expect everyone who had a grievance because they were picked up, as well as all their relatives and friends to raise a hue and cry and the Bureau would have to bear the entire brunt of the attack if the present status were continued. On the other hand, if there was a person believed by the Bureau to be dangerous who was not picked up because the Department had not approved the name being on the Security Index, the public would hold the Bureau at fault for not taking proper security measures.

The following recommendations were therefore made:

#### RECOMMENDATION #1

Mr. Belmont recommended that a letter which he had prepared and read to the Conference be approved which calls upon the Department to express approval specifically of the Bureau's standards for placing individuals on the security list or if they did not approve to say so. Mr. Belmont is reporting this matter separately and the Conference unanimously approved.


*Done  
Memo to  
5/11/51*

#### RECOMMENDATION #2

It was recommended that the Bureau go on record again with the Department requesting specifically that there be a review of the reports previously submitted to the Department in order to obtain the Department's approval for those names which the Bureau has already listed on the Security Index, a copy of which is furnished to the Department monthly.

*Memo to  
15-24-51*

Although it was felt that the Bureau could not afford to wait or delay its compilation of the Security Index for a decision by the Department, it was felt that just as soon as the Department had approved a name being on the list, the card on such subject would be moved to a special section of the file labeled "Approved by the Department." It was recommended that the Bureau continue the present policy of including on the Security Index files, but it was realized that since the name the Department approved, the responsibility for the



inclusion shifts from the Bureau to the Department and it was hoped that eventually the Department would approve or practically all of the names on the list. In the event there was some dangerous individual whose name was not approved by the Department, and it was felt that the Bureau would continue to keep this name on a card (but deleted from the list furnished the Department), so that at the time the emergency comes, we can request blanket authority for dealing with that group not previously approved by the Department following its specific review of reports. It was pointed out that for each name approved by the Department, there is less responsibility on the Bureau in connection with such arrests and detentions.

This recommendation was unanimously approved. — *OK. H.*

### RECOMMENDATION #3

*No action necessary until Dept. has approved A Security Index*

Once the Department has approved a name for the Security Index, before this name could be removed therefrom it was recommended that the approval of the Department be obtained.

Names are removed for several reasons, including death, disaffection and public disavowal, induction into the Armed Forces, imprisonment, and the development of some of these individuals as confidential informants and other reasons.

and were opposed as they felt that the Bureau was better able to judge the desirability of removing a name from the list; because the Bureau places the names on the list to start with and thus in applying the standards it is in position to remove the names when deemed logical; because before a name is removed, a memorandum is prepared showing the reasons therefor; and approval of at least the Division Chief must be obtained.

Messrs. recommended that Departmental approval be obtained in each instance as suggested prior to removal, except in the case of those developed into Bureau confidential informants. It is not believed that the names of informants should be furnished to the Department where they might be harassed, subpoenaed, or in turn furnished to the FKS for use. They further recommend that the names of such informants be removed from the list furnished to the Department but that a card be



retained on such informant for the Bureau's information and these cards put in a Special Section so that they will not be automatically picked up at the time of removals are made.

It is recommended that the suggestion be accepted that no names approved by the Department be removed without Departmental approval for removing it. For confidential informants, an oral conference would be held with the proper and trustworthy contact handling such matter to obtain authorization for the removal, following which a letter would be prepared showing the oral authority for such removal. Otherwise, it would be obvious when the new list is furnished the Department that some name previously approved was no longer there and an explanation would have to be made anyway. It is thus recommended that all names be approved by the Department before removal after the Department once has approved the name for inclusion in the Security Index.

I agree with

SPECIAL SECTION OF THE SECURITY INDEX

#### BACKGROUND

There are 230 names in this Section including espionage Subjects 62, Prominent Individuals 33, Pro-Rite Associates 10, Foreign Government Employees 27, United Nations Employees 64, Atomic Energy Program Employees 15 and U. S. Government Employees 11.

Under existing instructions, the field may not pick up those individuals in the Special Section except upon Bureau authority.

Copies of reports on all Special Section subjects have been sent to the Department except the subjects of espionage cases concerning whom reports have not been sent to the Department for security reasons. The Department has authorized the immediate arrest at the same time others in the Security Index list are arrested. of United Nations employees, Atomic Energy Program employees, and U. S. Government employees whose names appear in the Special Section.

Spionage Subjects: Security of operations. Immediate apprehension must be maintained. Investigations under way at time emergency is declared. The reason is a and no change should be made in procedure.

3-1-55

Pro-Tito Yugoslavs: Status of these individuals can probably be determined only at the last minute by the policy of Yugoslavia or the conduct of the individual. Yugoslavia now appears to be anti-Russian, and nothing could be gained by picking up Yugoslavs on the basis of nationality alone.

\* \* \* \* \*

Foreign Government Employees: Their status changes from time to time, from a diplomatic standpoint. The action taken may depend upon the relations existing between the employing government and the United States at the time of the emergency. Consultation with the State Department or clarification of status should precede arrests.

#### RECOMMENDATION "4"

The Executives Conference approved the above conclusions with reference to espionage subjects, pro-Tito Yugoslavs and foreign government employees in the Special Section of the Security Index.

\* \* \* \* \*

United Nations Employees: Departmental authority now exists for immediate pickups of United Nations employees under the Latoom Program, although the State Department must be advised of their apprehension.

is of the opinion that the Bureau should advise the State Department in advance of the apprehensions of United Nations employees in order to avoid possible international complications. These United Nations employees do not have diplomatic status, which is the reason the Department authorized their being picked up promptly without advance notice to the State Department. In order that the pickup program might be effective, those United Nations employees on the Security Index should especially be picked up promptly so that they could not give direction to a group of sabotage or subversiveness prior to their being apprehended.

favored the suggestion that they be picked up promptly and the State Department notified just as quickly as possible thereafter. If the State Department is notified coincident with the pickup, there would be no objection, but there should be no delay in notifying the State Department of any apprehensions with State Department officials.

All other members of the Conference present were opposed to picking up United Nations employees until after the arrest had been advised. It was pointed out that on Tuesday night, a State Department representative called at the United Nations and there was no delay in the notification program. They pointed out the desirability of giving a notice in order to avoid diplomatic conflicts. *OK.*

\*\*\*\*\*

Atomic Energy Program Employees: These employees are listed in the Special Section primarily so that the AEC can be notified prior to the apprehension of employees of this organization. The majority of the Conference was of the opinion that since we were working so closely with AEC and since the apprehension of one key man might seriously interfere with their plans in the production of Atomic Energy, that there would not be any appreciable delay, but as a matter of courtesy we should advise an appropriate official of AEC prior to the arrest of any AEC employee on the security list.


Messrs.

Favored this procedure. *Yes, N.*

... favored the prompt and immediate pickup especially of any AEC employee on the security list without any necessary preliminary of having to first notify someone at AEC. If during a working day, there would naturally be automatically a simultaneous notification with the arrest, but on a week end or at night, there should be no occasion for any delay in picking up these key potential saboteurs although courtesy would call for a reasonable prompt notification afterwards. Desired a notification simultaneous with the arrest.

\*\*\*\*\*

U. S. Government Employees: I believe that U. S. Government employees on the security list should be picked up after notification of an appropriate official of the agency by which they were employed. In order to prevent protest from Cabinet officers and agency heads, and the fact that government employees already have their loyalty oaths taken and still are working for the government is a fact. The loyalty oaths are still a part of the government's security program. The loyalty oaths are still a part of the government's security program. The loyalty oaths are still a part of the government's security program.



recommended prior notification only of intelligence agency officials where employees of their government are to be picked up.

It is favored picking up these individuals as quickly as possible, and the notification of the Government agency is to be made by court, promptly thereafter. If they are to be picked up without notification of the Government agency, we would be overruling the Loyalty Board just as well as prior to such notifications. These are people who ought to be handled promptly because of their strategic location in the Government.

\* \* \* \* \*

Prominent Individuals: Due to expected publicity in the event of the arrest of prominent individuals, the field offices have been instructed to prepare prosecutive-type summaries on each individual in this part of the Special Section of the Security Index and to submit reports each 6 months thereafter.

It is advised that to require the Department to review the reports on these individuals prior to their being picked up would indicate indecision on the part of the Bureau, particularly since our position has been that we are better fitted to say what names should be in the Index. The names of these individuals at present are included on the list which is furnished to the Department monthly. Copies of reports have also been furnished the Department on the Prominent Individual group.

RECOMMENDATION #5

The Executives Conference <sup>unanimously</sup> was of the opinion that these names should continue on the list and as heretofore recommended, the Department should be requested to review the reports concerning these individuals for the purpose of indicating their approval.

RECOMMENDATION #6

It was unanimously recommended by the Executives Conference that the present procedure of maintaining a Special Section be continued in order to facilitate supervision at the Bureau; in order to enable the Bureau to notify the various Government agencies and State Department as to Government employees, or United Nations employees or in employees who are picked up, and it was found more convenient to administer this file by maintaining this Special Section.

*Done  
Memo  
5-24-57*

*OK*

*24  
H*



, ARTHUR J

NB COM DC CS KF PRO NEWY

WM 02/02/13 ALBANY, NEW YORK

ART, A GREEN,

J G TURN, JOHN T ARTHUR,

AF 31 MB 16

IN CHARGE OF THE FINISHED PARTS DIVISION

AB ALUMINUM CO, 42 EAST 32ND ST, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

RAMSEY PLACE, LONG ISLAND CITY, NEW YORK

12345 000

Sample Security Index Card

ARTHUR J

Arthur J

12345 000

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 6, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS-  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDSPURPOSE:

To submit for approval the attached proposed SAC Letter instructing the field to open investigations on, and to consider for inclusion in the Security Index, individuals who have been members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949.

BACKGROUND:

Attached is your memorandum of June 26, 1951, to Mr. Ladd recommending that we instruct the field to open investigations where allegations have been received regarding membership of an individual in the Communist Party or any subversive group since January 1, 1949. This recommendation has been approved by the Director.

ACTION:

The proposed SAC Letter is attached.

Pursuant to recommendations of the Executives' Conference the attached SAC Letter, beginning with the fourth paragraph on page 3, contains instructions to the field regarding items 1, 2 and 4 as set forth on pages 5 and 6 of the attached Executives' Conference memorandum of June 30, 1951.

